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". . . the Soviet delegation w i h  to c x p m ~  itn m i s k i o n  . . . h the 
cqemtim which we &wed in wbrnitthg dis (dis~rm~mmt) r d n -  
tian to the G e t l d  AesembIy.. . :'
From its inception, the Soviet Union has ken a v o d  adv- 
of disarmament. The early years of foreign hemmion, the 
continued ideological hostility, d i n e d  to emphasize the e*tent 
of Soviet weakness aad developed a bitter, widmwake a d  realistic 
foreign policy. Russian diplomats welcomed anp maswe which 
wwld lessen the danger of a hostile combination or redace the 
gap between Soviet manpwer and the mechanized aunierr of&#. 
At first, living in vimd excommunimtion, Sovia Rmsia had 
m oppo&ty for positive contribution. No W e t  d d e p t b  
was invited to the Waslungton Conference on Ih - of 
192 I ,  although its decisions were to a lra  the b a b  of power in + 
an area of p d a r  interest to Russia fbr many years. In his rele- 
gram of prorest, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Wtd@ stated 
that his governmmt could not take into consideratim any dedaiw 
arrived at wiohwt its participation, but laid down the gareral 
principle that the Russian Government " w d  be happy to wel- 
come any disarmamat or reduction of the military dmp which 
b d e a  the workers of all countries!' 
Its fist invitation to a IarpscaIe European caafereaee came 
the next year. At the i n m m  of Great Brimin, rht Sovier Uni& 
at tded  the Gmoa Conference, which dealt with k o p n  
postwar problems. In his speech at the o p i n g  session Mr. 
Tchitcherin lost no time in raising the i s m  of di- when 
he motmcad it to be the intention of the Rwsian deIegatim "to 
propose the -era1 reddon of amamam d to suppore every 
proposition which tends to lighm tfie burdm of mhrhm, om 
the coo3ditian dmt this reduction is appIied to ttLe andm of dl 
cu?nuriw, . . !' Also dlmcmistic of lam Sovia propasals was 
his- unphaais on the "absolute prohibition of the most harharous 
f m  of wadbe," maeh as gas, aerial warfare, and other weapns 
aimed primarily at the civilian H a & .  The All-Russian Central 
h t i v e  Committee, commea* on the eighmth of May, 
r92t, oo tfie report of the M e t  delegatim at the (3enoa Con- * had the following to say: "It [is] pecuIiarly just and timely 
that the delegation, when it hat  m k  put in the Wereacq 
proposed general disarmment." The Soviet Govemmenr. had 
taka rhe lead but there was none to follow and the @on was 
not even discussed. 
During the early 'twenties the breach b#weea the Soviet 
Union a d  the League of Nations made ooopmtian d&dt upon 
the one major pmjecc which the League had then nraddea-  
the redncdm and limimtim of ammmnts. N d e s s  during 
this period there were some acdoas by the Soviet Govemmmt 
which should not be lost: sight of. In DeaEmber, rgz z, a h 
was held at Moscow on Soviet initiative at which Maxim Lirvinov 
propsed to the &l+ of Estonia, F I ,  and Poland that 
they "esublish a de6nite plan fbr the reciprocal duction of 
military deuiws, a plan based on the reduction of its army to 
zm,aoo men w the c d t i c w  that there be a reciprocal reduction 
of the armies of the Smtes on he westem boundary of Russia." 
The draft conventim on nonaggression ad arbitration which the 
Soviet submined was, however, r e j d  by the other Sam, which 
held that "mom1 disarmament" should p d e  material disarm- 
m t .  Also in December, 192 z, the Temh All-Russian h p s  of
Soviers appealed to a11 the people of the world for peace and 
pointed to the reduction of Russian military f o m  from s,om,om 
to 8m,m a d  from 8m,m to 600,000 as proof of its sincerity. 
"Nor in words, not in resolutions, not in promises, but in fact," 
the Congress smted, has the Soviet w i d d  its "atxschment p 
the cause of peace." 
In 1923 the Soviet Government also accepted an iavimtim, 
d d a g  from a League of Natitioas G m d  rcsolutim, to s d  a 
naval expert to a committee which was to consider the psibility 
of applying the Washington h t y  to States not originally parties 
45 
to it. Mr. h, *the Russian delegate, attended the mim of 
h mhommke which met at Rome aad there suppod the 
reciprocal limiwtim of tonnage, the m m d h r i o m ,  of the Bos- 
phoms and I k d a d e s ,  the pmhibitiam of rhe tatxy into h .. . Baltic of war w& of nonriparian Seam, and the d u d m r m  C 
tion of the Straits of Korea: However, the R Q S ~  delegation 
r e b e d  to accept the Luagne of Nations as the of my 
maty which might be drafted ad d d  thw tkG m d  of 
the h g u e  be r e p h d  in the draft by another ~ r n ~  
torbeone established to my wethe Wabhgtm lhy. 
It was, homer, a L q u e  h a f t  %~y which d d ' k t h  a 
significant staremat on the Soviet diwnmmmt h. 
!kpmk, I 923, the Temporary M i d  -mion, 
by the Assembly ia 1920, qbmireed ta its p e a  bodg. a IMft 
Treaty of Mwual Aseisrance. Instracted by thc Amudy 'h 
make proposals on geneal lines for the radnetim of: d a d  
amamerrts," the Temporary Mixed Cclmmissioo &idly ' 
bud its way to a compromise text, In w a y  Brief wmnnar]r, dm 
Gxmision h a d d d d  that themercrd&mof- 
cou ldnotxe laxdmepI ir id tms iob lb i~chweret tre~~  
of atmamatar races. Oa the other haad, enjopmt of W r p  
should Iead to a proportionate redaction of v. T h e k c ,  
the Draft Tmty pmlaimed aggressive war to be a W p b o l  
posed oormnon acdon agaiast an aggressor natia~a, tr, h&&hd 
by the h g u e  Gundl after a b r i e f e d  of-. T h  
parties to the Tmty were later to iaform tfPe M of '%he 
rcduaion or limitaria of zamamm whi& 
proptionate to he security furnished by dw @.- or 
bydefaive agreemmts,'' and also to cmpmhthcpqamh 
of anygead plm for amrament redacrial M&e CBrmeil 
would propose in the. farure. The reactions of & 7. 
ranged ffomrhedeterntined b p t i m i s m o f t h a F d t a ~ o n -  
qualified disapprwal of the British, b y  Madhdd 
1Thttwopreeedin par~graphsmbmdmohs-&by 
e*a. K&+ of ~nanm L.W a-ha h6aa d Sniol 
~ w m M o m w , h r ~ ~ I ~ d d d ~ W ~ a d  
-t," Ut pp. 1 2  Pad I j .  (NO. 391, 1033). 
. 3  
camid on the difWtia+ admitted by the T v q  
Mhd -aim itself, of d w  aggmsioa, ad on the 
powem p p s d  for the Lxap W I .  
.. I ln its q I y  of M d  I 2, rgq,' dw Soviet e m w d y  d e h d  
ht an d t i d  dimtorship would d t  h gmmhg 
#power to the C o d 1  to decide the identity of cfie s i g p ~ ~  a d  
aIso qudaned the p i b i i p .  of dewmining such ideneity in 
e Y e r y ~ ~ a n s e * T o ~ e y a & 4 2 t r e m ~ t g t o l i n k ~ m d  
olrrd~ to the b& probIems of s d t y  have areeilbgd S# MI m y  
e p a ~ o n s b y ~ ~ ~ t S ~  ~ ~ t o m k t h e i r t r r a e ~ t i ~ s .  
The Soviet Gmmmeat, w m e  Tchidmin, the adoptian 
of masum by dl Gmemmats fbr the limitntirrn of ammmrs 
~ s o g p n v e a n d ~ r a w k t b g t i t i s ~ v e b t h e g a e a r e i w  
should be ra id  imm*9 ~ ~ d y  of other pmbhs  
qhi& aremoxedifficalt to dve.'' Theoahpartideofdw Drarft 
l k q  of whi& the Soviet d&dy approved w a  Adele Nine, 
which dealt dridl d e d  h t i e r  mua. The reply was -m 
mdmg,  howevet, Ew the a x m e  p r o p i d s  wbi& it e. 
St&@ toward its gad of ;Pimple, direct rednctim of ama- 
mats, the Soviet propa l  that Smm h their war bdgm, 
shl-iy disband irregular r a i l i q  hes, ad sper the 
maximmn m a g t h s  af theit standmg atmieg a d  d e s  with- 
fcudam &day. Sovia plicy toward m d d  qpnhidm d 
aonf;erence was horn dominard by a antion somewhat 
c q m h l e  to h e  attimde of the United Sam d A m d a  at 
tbe time. In hb 1- %hi&& rejecred any plan fbr an sl- 
natiooal o r p k E i c a  wfricfi d "imply zhe @ W y  of 
m e a m  of dbung exercised by myhtmmdanal ador-  
ity wha- against a State:' The p r m  of a E a m i k  
S w i e t ~ ~ ~ t ~ h l l i n t o ~ .  
~ R a d n c d o o o f ~ T r ~ a f M d & & ~ t R e p l i e s  ffom 
Gmmmm. A. 35.1924. IX, p. I& A of Natsorrp pukdkaa. 
-sIM', pp. 9 m 11.  
N a d y  A e  the k g n e  from *ah it was excluded, 
the Russian Government proped the a~~lvming of r g m d  
w e s s  which would appoint im own executive organs for the 
purpose pf carrying wt, d m q h  voluntary v w ,  the qxcific 
wgptions which the Soviet had aIready entertd? W s  for a 
special cwference to consider the reduction of ammum k p n  
tobehearda l sohBr i ta inaadaheUniredhd' iaDb-  
cember, 1925, the Soviet Govemmux was invited by the Sacreeory 
GeneraI of the Imp of Nations m take part in ehe D i ~ t  
C d k m c e  a d  in the work of the prepratory commisioo8. 
In ~ i t e  of rapid Soviet accepmce of the ~~ its s m d  
participation was delayed for aImost m o  yt~rs by die iu &ding 
which existed between the Sovik snd Swiss Gmmumm- In 
1923 the mwda of the chief Soviet d e l v ~  to thc Lawtame CmP 
hencq Vomky, had been followed by the acqaittal of hiti 
assassin, a Russian h g r C  of Swiss d m .  In a d o  of 
r e u h h t i o n ,  I d  gov-t8 had excluded the n+ds ofthe 
other from heir territories, a d  it was only in A& il,rgq, tbat 
this dis~utf2 w a s  settled. 
0. &king his @am a the f o d  sersim of chc p p r a m y  
ecrmmission in October, Maxirn Litvinov was ma d figid 
comcbms and an acidity of criticism which r#eeaed to ca- 
h the ho&ty the Soviet had come to expect fcom d a r  pear8. 
The h o s t  questioning acceptance m 1924 of rtte 
"Zimviev l a w "  a d  the murder in 1927 of the %vie$ &iser 
at Warsaw, Voykov, were d y  am& rbe more +d 
41th s m d q  t o r n &  shikitim whiehdw "-hL' bwe 
swat of the h 8 k l  mgptbB. In t913 & b d  ~ d k k d -  ' m r m h  of the Tern- Mired Coormisk, hPd a&d Dr. Jm 
? h d l m - t h i s p r n  a n l . u r ~ r n i n a m c a m a c ~ m + m  
in mi in h c  ~ o i t a i L r e .    he a a r ~  of&- 
d t c d i n a . a i u o f  a a I ~ k n o w n u t h c " L h d m t ~ ~ " A ~  
a= I~PW a p p m ~ d  o E F  - of di- m po- *, 
it h e  ~ o s -  p m z s  in it thc -A ,. 
mnes a h &  nad v a y  a i g n i h d y  m g g d  a smnntae Advhy  CCP 
f e r e a c e o n ~ m k d e d e v c r y t h r # y ~ a ~ r a p r t ~ ,  
ind~cndyofthcLc;rgu~.  T b e p w m o f t h e ~ w a e h t b d ~ r  
(1) advlce nnd (2) he ~ o f ~ ~ f h r t h c ~ c l f ~ ~  
Cmaudog M a .  =, h d, h - m q d m ,  
d e r  the gnidnncc of the Cwacil of tbt 
f ~ i % d . . ~ ~ w h i c h t o S o v i d e g p ~ m m i l a o d p r  
s e~eay pint of m. F a d  wi& an rmceasing barrag.e of &ti- 
1 
dm, fitvinov soon showed himself to be the equal of all dw 
I delepm, both in aiadsm and in d h e .  In m w a  to a bitter 
attack by Lord Cusheadun, Maxim Litvinop said: 
1 will not ask the b m M e  delegate for the British Enpire by what 
right he pats such quescims to me, w h d m  he reaognizes my ownrright 
r eo crossexamhe him as to he sincerity of his Govetrmrcnt, WWXC the 
British h e m m m  has sent iw del@m here from sheer love of pram 
or hr any ohm motives, . . . and whethtr he would stigmatize ne &mgc 
d t e k h K s d O t h e ~ ~ t $ h w e s o h b e Q o t b i n g m s o l ~  
r series of questions and disrnssious ari 3 me 
. * &mumon, hua 
mnkiag it hpssible fbr irto. , . get on w' hi labum. . . P 
Into such a setting, playing almost the role of an mfbt tsrribk, 
Litvinov hurled the Soviet plan for general a d  ampkte  dis- 
amamem, including "the complete abolition of dl armed k 
on Id, on the sea and in the air." The dmiled dcaft for the 
conmum for immediate, complete d peral  d i q t !  
submitred on February I 5,  1 9 ~ 8 ,  was dismissed by most delegsta 
as misleadingly simpIe and sup~~6ciaIIy pracdd but it contained 
certaio featma which might well repay a glance at & time. The 
draft d d e d  the order in which the technical operation of die 
armament should be carried out and then made a p r o p 4  for the 
i n t e m & d  supervision of this process which is p m m t i v e  a d  
heresting but which was largely overiaoked in the storm aroused 
by the principle of compIete disarmament itedf. 
Chapter Four of the Drafi l h r y  provided that, within b 
months of the coming into fbrce of the Gmvention, a system of 
Cantrd Cotmnissioas was w k sa up on the i n m t i d ,  State, 
and local. levels. The Pemmetrt International CoPttrnission of 
Cantrol was to be entrusted with the "snperpisioa aad m o I  
of the normal and proportional progress of ' '* the 
Stare rormnissions with mordimtion ofthe= 
c d s s i o n s ,  and h e  1 4  commissiws ditmly with the "work 
6DesrmMltr of t h  p r r p l r r a ~  Cmmniuieff fw tb Dis- C m  
S e s  VI, Minutes of the Fit& S&m. IX. Jharmom~ne, 1 9 ~ 8 .  
6, p. 268. 
a k A p p & C .  
of dimmammt within the radius of their activities." The member- 
ship provisions wete uaorehodox. In confbamity witb its ideology 
and in an effort to draw on '%tho classes ofthc ppdatioa which 
arc most interested in the speedy coonpledan of di-" 
b SoPiet pro@ that the Permanent Internatid Cumhion 
of Control, for example, be made up of an eqaal nu+ of xepra- 
smmtives of legislative Wits aad "of the trade &om d other 
workmen's orgaujzatims of alI h e  Sram ~~ in tire 
p t  Convendon." mere was no prwisioa fbr the Pad i t i d  
di@omatic qremmtive d d y  an idsea  to the 
League of Nations in the statemem that the Pcrmmm W- 
t i d  Cmrrmissim of Canm1 may be , m p p l ~  at a lottr 
date by repmataavea of international a s d a i s  which aim 
to establish p d c  relations beween Smtcsl "ad whi& have p- 
sued this aim with SUCCESS!'(!) In the State ad l d  QOmmi Jau 
he membership was to id&, in additian to mpmmtaim of 
trade unions and workmen's organizations, repmamiveer of 
public as&fiom and "of the peas- and of the d t  a d  He 
of the armed f m  of the Smte in qnestioa." W d y  ddd 
from membership were profasiomal a+oMiem ad && of 
the ministrim d war, who might be p r d  to Iove war PB a 
erafi and a and all h s e  whme e c d e  gain waa r o d  in 
the produccim of mmidobls. 
At the apx of this propod pyramid of eoatrol d the 
Permmat In-t id  Canmission of Control, cHarged with the 
overall supvision atd geaeral d t i o n  of rhe p m e t ~  of 
dhmammt. The Ptmrmmt h t e m a t b d  Gmmhsirm uf #n- 
ml also had the respsibility of deciding oa the m d d  of 
d a d m  of mamid, on the voInme and h t i o n  of firtare amu 
m-, d on he regulation of tradeinaans. These 
were the appointad tasks. Some of the qmsMitia here 
apportioned to the Stares r h d v e 5 ;  they wm, to give the widat 
publicity to the prcgress of dimnumat and &o ta amct +la- 
don translating brtaehes of the Ccnvention into dmwtic hw. 
But much more y t i v e  for pr--day dxa&t were the 
powers assigned--or notaPsigneFko the Wtid mmnidm 
Atdde 5s of the Draft is important enoagh to quote at lu@: 
K1' : All the ~oaanodng ! h e t i  . . . shall & the o r p a  of the P e r m  
b c m h d  b a s b  ofConml evcry facility fw the full ia*- 
1 . doa of nll nclivitics of the Stacc, of public kztim Pad of pivase 
F. perms which are comead with the Mcatiun of dismmmc, or 
I whih, in the view of the Permanertr Intetnational Gmmission of Colntrol 
or im orgaaa, give Ej w M dmbm c~wcefning he oaPerPnnce of the rmder- 
m k i y s  m1unnly e n d  im with q a r d  ta disarm~mmt aud the dia- 
QWI- of d milimy ~~. 
T h i s S o v i t t ~ w a s n o t a s d a s m a y ~ a t ~ f o r  
it was after all but a more dehnitt appliation of the @pie of 
immatioflal hmtigatim ss set fmh ia the Pmtmd of Gama 
of 1924, which called for international investigation of any in- 
cidcnt in which a nation was accused of vidating the @ens 
for the duction ofgnnamems as ppided for in the W 1 .  
In spite of this @ern, however, ond of the work then being 
d m  by the P r e p a r w  Commission, there wm little s,gious 
discussion of this p a l  for fall-0- hemdonal inpaion. 
D& waa v s e d  as to the sincerity of the Soviex mpenm- 
tivc and many critics &It that the w e  of the propal was 
simply to relieve the So& G m x m m e  of a -e of M t p  
aad to p n i t  it to k i o p  im inherent @. 
The mm faa of h e m a t i d  w o n  would probably have 
insured wide publicity to its findings. However, to Ix really 
effective, inspec t imhaher  on an hternatiod, national or 
local basis-mum bc backed by swng mmsures of enfbrcmmt. 
And, revohtimary as its proposals for the ina+on of inrer- 
national i n w o n  were, the Soviet plan lacked that stroag 
measum of edkauent.  MIndeed, the measam were antichactic, 
providing d y  that in the case of s direct breac)l of the hveatim 
by one of the d n g  States, "an exuaordmaty assembly" 
of theit representatives "shall be mrmmaned as s ti on sly as 
possible by the Permanent Internadd Commission of Cuntrol 
to decide upon dw steps to be cakea. The steps taken to exercise 
pramre must not be of a miIitary nature." Faced wirh the o p a  
opposition of the whole of the rest of the world, rhe Soviet did 
not fed it d make any $monger pmpals. 
This project was nejecced by the Preparatory Cotllmissioa but 
Litvinov met the charge of insincerity and d t y  by present- 
h g  almost immediately, in March, 1928, a new draft convention 
d v e d  in moxe limited terms. It provided foa partial die 
armament as the fist step to complete di-ent.' Detailed 
artides provided foI the division of States iuto groups and the 
reduction of their armmentfs mrdiag to a hed p+m. 
The Sv ie t  also w s c d  the prohibition of a l l  preparatun for 
chemical warhe and for bombing. The propisims fbr d 
were very s h k  to those made earlier. IXhis propsd aha met 
 wid^ a r e W .  "Of ad the countrim r-ted said 
Litvinov, "the Sooiet i h e  most thmtened. It is the object of 
hostility arrd ill k4ng on the part of the whole bourgeois world, 
Its eomies are legion, its friends few. . . . N ~ ~ ,  the 
Soviet delegation has not put fomard the insecatity of the USSR. 
. . . it has demanded no exception from the b-1 ca the 
cont.rary, it h itself propoaed the most d i d  Eom of &a- 
armament." 
In 1932 h e  General Codaewe for D i s v  W y  
o p e d  its longdelayed sessions. There was little to dkhpiah 
the tone of it8 meetings from those of rhc Prep~ratarg Corn- 
mission. A ~ ~ J I I  & Soviet made its mggestions and @ they 
were knmkd down like a row of kingpins in the Gumid Gm- 
mission of the Confereace. Litvinw however war not hmtd by 
this opposition and, borh to emphasiae the g d  of the Sovk 
Government and to keep the issue before the G d e m q  p q m d  
that it " h e  its work on the principle of general oad cmpke 
disarmament!' He later also called fox the duction of armamam 
on the progressive-pmprdonal principle and fbr p d  disarms- 
mmt according to che outline which had been rejected, aa well as 
for a meamre of qualitative disarmament. 
Conducted in the full glare of open diplomacy, the W e n c e  
ar least gave wide publicity to the d X m  of opinion w U  
split its mmhship but it could do little to bzing than wguk. 
To the F r d ,  living with the nighonare of a reviving Gmmmy 
constantly before them, the Soviet proposals s d  ridkuhsly 
inadequate and inrroduced d y  for their embancassmeot value. 
7 k A p p d x E .  
To &un aad to many &as, disarmament without a corresponding 
gain in security w a s  out of the question, arad it was the "snbjeccive 
principle" of an "armament consisteat with national security" 
that received their q p n .  To h e  Soviet, the involved disrki0~26 
and counterdistiactioas which followed h m  this approach meant 
d y  m e  ding: 
I t  is cssedal to remember that wirh the i d  of "problm of disarm- 
a m d '  postwar impcriaIism has created one of the most dxh . . . in- 
mumats for dimacting the atreotion of the masses froan the diaboric 
work of the p w a l  d s  and d i p h d c  &nets? 
After the rejection of a Soviet proposai prohibiting the use of 
W i  plaua a d  calliag fdr the immediate application by alI 
Saates of the Protml of Geaeva of 1925, which e b i t e d  
chemical and haaeriologid warfare, the Soviet d c l ~ t i m  felt 
i d f  obliged to vote against the hid RaoIution of ahe General 
Commission, considering it in every way d e M v e .  
While the Disarmamat C w k e  conrirmed its d e s  and 
progressed in the analysis of its probh  and in p h  for the 
reduotion of amammts, Germany begaa to prepare for its re 
armament by the rraobdktion of finance and iDdmmy and then 
bypa&cal a m m m t s  measures. Uader&eseroaditions the policy 
of Soviet Russia with re- to dimmame fdowed the 
same pattern as that of the 0 t h  powers. 
On October 23, r e 1  the United ~a't irms met in C;eneral As- 
sembly for h e  purpose of dimming "any questions or any matters 
within rhe scope of the . . . a d  making reeommeada- 
tims thereon to its 111 mankship or to the k u i t y  Council 
or to bottr. The agenda eonmid no item on di-t until 
Ocrober ap, when Sovia initiative led to the inclusion of an 
a d d i t i d  paragraph calling fbr a discussion of the g a d  reduction 
of all weaps.  "The time has wmq" said Molotov, 'ko carry 
8 Koro* K. A., and rov, V. V., ' (in hdim), 
of rhc Introduction by B . k .  (*=fig H- E c  
out 1 gmml kti&~od of smumenrs (incl*) lmnie cwrc 
gy."lo The United SEaces w h e d  this pmpmal bur d a d  
that disamamm mnart include effective safeguards by way of 
inspxim. 
Thae waa a h  he questim of the "principle of mwhky.'' 
M a e  m a g  the great powen the Soviet Union has amisteatly 
&bed to admit of any modification whatsme~ of &is pidple ,  
although it can dm be mid that some d e r s  gave d y  l u k m  
~apprt  o Ms. Jhmch's p h  fox a pard  aWum of the veto 
power. Certainly a C k m  witboot the veto power and d e g t d  
would nor have received approval in the Senate arty more than in 
the but American repmenmuves bad since trial to 
work their w-ay to its hitaum through prmb. In the Assunbly 
Smator C a n d y  said thar "We hist that the question of decdvt 
safeguards, . . . maart not be Mocked and desaoyed by any Sraft . , , through d~ vao. . . !'" Pmiave a c c o m ~ ~  scud 
d k d y  on this k k g r o d  of fUndamearal divqmce. 
On N O V ~  28 Mr. Mob touched off rht d i d o n s ,  
whiefi were to become higbIy iuvolvul and dFamatic d whicb, 
at h e  mi, lad to an outburst of opth im perhaps grater than 
justified by tht scope of actoarl achievement. Befbrc, an t ~ ~ ~ ~ t i v t  
Politid and Scauity Committee, Molotov summuid the ill 
e f f e c x s o f t w o d ~ s a r m d t h e n c a l I e d o n d t o w m k d  
foreifLing arrsc aad friendly reladons h e e n  peoplear. FOE the 
p u r p o s e o f d e v c l o p i n g ~ t i o n a l ~ o n i n ~ ~ o f  
g a d  peace he proposed a p e r a l  rednctian of mmmmtg, 
embracing all d a  a d  covering all forms of amamam. 
Tbe widest hope d +tian were amused whea, in an ap 
pmt about-fa= of the Russian s d  in the A& &mgy 
Cammissicm, Molotov decked that "internatid control . . . 
should provide for , . . special o q m  of i~spection!'~ This s t a b  
ment was 50 electtifying in icseIf that few stoped to coxdm the 
fact that h e  mo ChnmbSions-for the reduction of ammmats 
ard for the cmml of atomic eaergy-proped by the Raesian 
10 Tks New Ykh T k ,  Ocaoba 341946. 





+ '  repenrative were to k c'establirphd within the h e w o r k  of 
. the W t y  sad that the adm of this fmmwmk 
hdmbeenindid. 
Oa &e very next day, howwer, high h o p  gave way ta a 
" ~ l  of bewildemat whm Mr. Vichuuky m e  m say dm hc 
&st step in a general disarmament mtwt be the outlawing of rhe 
atamic b o m b L L a  s d  of DamocIa mspded over our heads 
by a single thread." He thar went on to swve notice that tke Soviet 
w a d  main its veto xight in the operation of the two c o m m i s k s  
t MoZotov M pro+ the previous day: "We uphold the lan- 
L mimiry of the great powus; and we do not mean to mmnce dis 
On Tkcmber 2, Senam M y  voiced the bitter 
d i s a p p h ~ t  ad concern o f m  deIeg&ms when heranidad 
~ I C  world ti~at ady a few days & ~ r . ~ o b m ~  
the principle of  in^^ comrol d iqwtion. Yet how, 
asked M y ,  "can there be internatid control and impmion 
if any member of the Security C o d  can rise in his war a d  
h q s e  a veto at any stage of the in on amd That is 7- not inrematid; that is iadividad!' ' The Brish m theit side 
intensified q p r t  of a C a n a d h q m m d  d s d o n  of mml 
to be eatirely qarated from the S e a s r i ~  Catmil.* 
An authoritative q h a t i o n  of Molowv'~ p e c h  of December 
f d  will probably k o long time in caning. Cahhly the 
@Ieasingprogmsofthesatel l i tepcace~es~wellasthe 
h a s  of British and Amerian a m d e  wwM seem to serve as 
+a1 explanarim of his surprisingly codator y tone. The s@ 
hegaa with a blast at &we who persist in h b g  di- 
widr the e s t a b l i s b t  of collective s&y, a statement much m 
h e  same vein that Tchitcherin had followed almmt a quarter of a 
mimy earlier. This is a fact aot to be ipd in i d f  bemuse 
of tbe contimiry in Soviet foreign poiicy to whid~ it bears wimess. 
Then, pasing to the subsme of the Soviet Govermmr'~ 
pmpds,  M o l m  said that the Sovier had hoped for a hrm *- 
tionfmmthe Assembly dmr"thetimehas come to s a h r  the 
general redactiw of ~ ~ , " ' ~  expadon an rhe question 
of the prohibiam of atomic energy a hdy, a v t i m  of 
the 'hecessity of establiehiag dk&Ie hernational -1 over 
the mecution of the decisim fbr a gmeral duction of m e a t s  
and the prohibition of atomic weapons. . . ." In d e r  to acmmpIish 
these pupsea he Sovia was willing to take the Amaicaa drPft 
as a h i s  of d i h w .  
The hem of h e  speech lay in Molotods d i d a n  of the 
scope of the vao power. In P d & c  defense with which kw 
w d  quarrel he mtcd that "only the arepiameat of tmmhity in 
the Secnrity Cwncil ad, ahve d, of mdmity hem the 
five gemanent munbers can guarantee the adoptim of& decish 
m reduce armammts." Throughout history the e q d q  of- 
has km more of a legal dogma than a @tical reality a d  the 
approval of the p t  powers has been 4 8 1 .  for effecdvc 
&. %weper, it was not the basic dedsion of d d n g  amw 
that was here at stake but the method by which tbe W r n  was 
to be carried our. Was rhe day-tday option of& P' t: 
and atomic eaergy eacnmissims to be subject to the V#O poarcr3 
On Nowber 29 Vishinsky had indiated that it w d  be. Sir 
days later, however, h an endrely digtreat Molotov cbIdsd 
his listeners for Eallring so much a h t  the veto in colmaction 
with hpeetim and control; gUCh talk, he said, is attrmpt to 
evade a straight answer to the question raised r q d m g  the 
gened reddon of ammmts!' "k s b d d  be qoi# o b v h s  
that the question of the well-known prk& of M y  oper~t- 
ing in rfie Securiv Conacil has no relation at dl to tht work of 
the commissions themselm. heqaently, it in endrJy wmng 
to consider the mattex in rhe light h t  any gmammt 
the 'right of veto* will bt in a p i a o n  to hindet the folfiIment of 
the eonwol and hspctiafls!' 
This dramatic shift in mid-battle &ad thc .my to mmpo- 
mise. British support of the Caaadian draft wss widdram while 
the Soviet accepted the Ameri~a~l ~ Q I I  dw tHe Sacmity 
Cotmcil, inmad of drawing up h e  rules of @on kdf* w e  
g .  - .  drrrft Sosptnrians of those rule8 fbr the approval of dl States. The 
sharp rtlief which Mowed Molotov's speech obsctved samewhat 
&t riame of the Soviet concession, which did not in h indve _ .  
1 , my f d a m a d  def3atture from traditional Soviet: plicy. An 
fear of hostile combinah has always rempered Soviet 
p"dcipion in international orgabtiun and at Imt @ally 
. , explains the 4 ty of the Soviet grip on the veto power. The facr 
rbat m their d a y d y  operatiom the conrmissions wiIl h in- 
# < ' d+mt of h e  veto power giva them a chauce of mxess. 
However, ehis detracts lirrle from the protective power of the 
veto because the basic decisions wmanhig the range of heir 
powers will k &ed in the security Cotmcil. The lasting 
importance of he Soviet concession will probably rewlt as much 
h t h e ~ h t i t w a s o f f e r e d d ~ a s f i o m i t s m ~  
Withaat Molotov's speech of  tion" on" the d to ggreement 
cm a disarmamat resolation w d  have beea Hocked. A d  the 
United Nations could not a f f d  such a scagg* faiIure.. 
On other di-ent issues the Soviet made ia s h e  of 
compromisers and suffered one major defist. In paragraph m o  of 
h e  fmaI Resolution, Molotov w c q d  a specific stammt 
endorsing internatid eanPor and hspection which had not 
been ineInded in the original Russian Draft and a h  a p e d  to a 
&use in paragraph fm d i n g  for h e  creation of the armed fom 
meadond in Article 43 of the M e r .  On the other haad, he 
uuried his point eoncemhg the withdrawa1 of h ter- 
rimria of Membefs where hey were mtioned without ronseat 
M y  expressed in agreements msismt with h e  Charter. 
The one tnaj~r defeat was occasioned by &e sensitive issue of 
troop smqth. With Greece and China clearly in the back of 
bs mind, Molotov p r o p d  ed a s  of uoops smtimed in 
6 i d y  t err iq ,  on November to he accepted an Arneri~an 
mgptim for a m r m s  as we11 of mmp stationed in former enemy 
territories but rejected another d i n g  hr iaformatim on fbrcea 
at home. These dam, togmher with infomation oo bases and their ' garrisons outside of hame d t q  were to be made avdaIde 
within a month after the decision of the Security Conncil. Parallel 
to this discussion ran a Briti& proposal h r  obt-thespot v&- 
rim of rqmm of troop s m a g h  and a Ruarshu desk for inrmediaa 
in fodm an amammrs installatiems, boeh of which had been 
r e j d  in committee. 
Oa D e a d e r  ra Andrei Vishinsky, Soviet Depaty Foreign 
Minister, dramatically offered w a c q t  i n d d  iaspectian 
of tr&p st@ "on the spot in the tmiq of any mmld'la if 
Great Britain and the United States of America w d  agree to 
bmaden the resoIntion to indude amam-. While the maIadon 
of this rmexpctd offer ws gtiil b m g  read Sir H a d q  Saw- 
cross hurriedly scribbled a draft resolution oa a Aeee of note 
paper and rushed down with it to tfit  speaker'^ podium In d i ~  
"Gentlemen's A.grecmentW Sir NartIcy s d c d  iu bfaidiag 
together the two aspem of Vishinslcy's ppab  whb a p r w i i ~  
that the ~ ~ a m l  mprvisory a p c y  be &e of dw a 
point for which the British had been d s b m d y  p m s h g I  M k  
a spirited v b a l  duel b e e n  Molotov aad Sir w,which 
brought Jleerrs h h e  speemtors, Molotov agreed m thc mob 
tim "in principle!' 
However, the hastily+onsuucted d 9 d m  & fbrtA the 
opposition of the American delegation as it came to rtcognize 
that it would require all Members of the United Natims pa 
report their troop s m q d u  by January &st ad, mom imp- 
to allow the inspi011 of all arms hmkioad l ,  idd ing  d c  
installations, by January fihmh. E v a  an amhmr iqonodaced 
on the following day by Sir Hardey, statbg that cao b@m of 
mmrnmts was to take place till an ahpaw m a d  
control and inspe&on system had been devisd, did rm mi@ dw 
American ddegation, which s u p p o d  the d m  of dw inter- - i 
natiunal system eavisagui in the Baruch Phn. 
The deadlock which threatened to block the passage of & 
Disarmma Raolntion itself was averred dmqh tk Pcdw of 
Paul-Hd Spaak, who separawd the two & whkh Sir 
Hardey had so sensatidy united on l h c m k  to, pad pt 
them to individual vote. The troop cenwrs ~~ was defiiated. 
A miId substitute resolauw was passed which merely mkd the . , 
I* Tkc New YZk T b s ,  & c m k  1 I, 1946. Tbs &via a b j h  ro 
i Q d p D E d o o O f b o m e ~ h d ~ r ~ s h o d K l m s w f P e m d m # J t f i e l i n e .  
&tiT Comd to d& as s m n  as ps ib le  the type of info- 
h l 7  dmt raembeFar of che United Nations must spbmit to the 
hd to implement the Disamranaent Resdorion. The IXS- 
armama~r Resohrdm itself was ado@ by acchatim on De- 
cembcr 14.'~ 
The G d  Assembly ended ia sessions in a spirit of ami- 
ability and hope. Althwgh the decision d e d  on di-t 
was couched in rhe fonn of a resolution d i n g  on the Security 
~ o n a d i r t o d e t h e ~ p e d t i c ~ ~ , s n d ~ t h ~ o n l ~ a ~  
limirralp step, the mere faa that Hfinnimity could be reached was 
i g n i h .  
III-GNCLUUON 
From h e  begimring the Swiw Union bs beefl a comsi- 
Ieader in di-t p h s .  Many b r s ,  among them fear? 
suspiam and a gemhe concern for peace and s k y ?  have 
combined to forge this attide. Consistently Swict 
have o@ all a t t u n p  to vitw disanuament d y  M a aot- 
relative of secwiy. "It U swmetimes hinted," d Molotov, 
"that we &odd 6rst insure Wvt d t y  and d y  after that 
h a s ~ d c m e s h o $ d w e s e x a b o u t d i ~ ,  Jtisqaitecssyto 
perceive the f a h e m  o f t h i s  argam~! '~  hp.tiently the Rwsians 
have a d v d  the immdiate reduction of armaments and the 
prohibitiaa of ceffain @&1y dangmm weapm, sllch as 
gas and atomic energy w- as well as- bacteriolqiai A. 
Soviet mphaivis on the simpler, quick d& of disamamm 
does not, however, arise &om a belief in disarmament as a 
but, quite w the contrary, from a snspidm that the capitalist- 
imperhlise nations have Iitde interest in disarming and b t  only 
tfieampkstmefbds haveany chanceofsuccess: ". . . d~ebistory 
of the dimssions oaneeming disamament, is he history of the 
am& for heganony within the imperialist amp!'80 
Fear sad suspicion have played their role dm. All Soviet Imdexs 
h i r e  an h t  traditional fear of hostile ' ' . b i d y  
rhey have asked for information on h e  ~rnrnmeatas of odms: m 
@cipting in tfre "Gentlemen's Agmemmt*' Molotov ww 
fdowiag in the path outlined by earlier Soviet ~ t a t i v e s .  
Fear d suspiaon have dso been responsible m patt fbr & 
h h t  attitlEdt mahahed by the Soviet toward any effective 
international commm power. Eva  Litvinw at Gaem stopped 
s k  of an dgEtive internatid sanction; the attitude of M o b  
onthewmpower i sd  known. 
The broad owlhe8 of Sovia policy row& disarmamene have 
mmhed fairly coasm~ but as the Union evolved to im pxat  
stru@ a d  iduemce, the aggressive badge@ of early yeaus 
yielded m a more moderate m e  of Waship. At 6rst Soviet 
represenmdves seemed to go out of thkr way to emphize the 
tevoIutionary character of heir leadership: in 19 2 7  bumtchmky 
said that '%is i the h s t  time that a propod has beea male by a 
workers' Government on this p t  question which in- dl 
humanity. This Eact will perhaps provide us with uew bptm 
At the present time the Soviet, now one of the I d h g  ltaanbers 
of the United Nations instead of an outsider, scum to set i ~ s  
in a different light. In taking credit for mmc of thc Pchicvunam 
of the GeDersll Assembly, @&1y in rehiobl to the as- 
ammmt Raolntion, the Soviet disclorn rhat it -beif 
the Ida not so much of the workers alone ns of d pmgrrslnc 
forces throughout the world.= T h e  greater h e  oftbe 
Soviet Gommment, in its own eyes, with dte mucttm of rhe 
United Nations, the greater the hope fbr && farare. W . i  
the h i n g  participation of the Soviet Unim M e  mn be W 
in cwlmon effort. 
Ci Russian), published d m  & diractian of  V. P. Fowmlrin, in I*$, 
d i ~ e o t h ~ i z a d n s h d m M y a t r b e ~ d & r e r t  
mas=. (p. 397). 
U h a h P r s k y  at the P m p a t q  r * .  ~r 3 4  8917. 
-a, Stria V, IX. Diasmmmca~, 191k IX. 1. 
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~ P L E ' S  ~~T FOR F~REIGN AFFAIRS TO G ~ ~ A L  S~WCAR+ 
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' C  
. . . The attitude of h e  Soviet Govermnear to h c  d e d  h g u e  
of Nptiopls bw kquuttly bern exprwed in the decImhr of ita r e p +  
dbk -&ear. The Gmcmma~'s aaitude to the m d d  
L q p c  of N&us remains dtered.  lt regards iz as a mahi011 of amain 
Smtw, d a d g  ro u q  the power over other SPolcs a d  masking 
their ~ p t s o n t t r e r i g h m a n d ~ ~ l c ~ o f o t h e r n a d o n s  byafalsc 
nppearr;mct of gmmdltsar legaliry and h the hrm of the hued 
by tfie Guncil or . . . A s d y  of the L a p c  of Natia, ece. The 
%a Chmmat m a i d a s  iu e0llvieeEon tbat this pwbhmatbd 
body r d y  w r mere mask ta ~ ~ f l d  ftam the broad mses the 
m i v t  nims of the imperiaht pohq of oerrain Grwt Powers w their 
4 s .  The Sovier Go-t 6nds amfirmation fw ita conpicdons 
time that a State ammhg the l d b g  role in the Ltague of NPrioms 
r decisim on i twrnahd qncatioma, tonchhg the int-erese~ of tbe 
Swiet Republic. 
The Soviet Government cpmot, however, saeri6t w sllch w r  
its emmuit aspiratioas to by mtry mans at its digpod,  d p+ 
sible ~dsmce m rhe cask of dq the Mea of milimhu lyiq u p  dl
peopla, h e  m k  of prwmhg armed d m  md the cmmfidatkm of 
g m d  peace. %k as orre the h o p  of the Soviet Go- for the 
achieyement of dmc a i m  in the presmt world sirnation, it wonld d& 
it wc of the question m rtirain from taking the least @ble oppndty 
f o r d o ' ~ ~ , ~ w e v e r l i t d e , m d a t t h e m t e e r o f t h e r e d o E d a n  
of armaments. The Soviet EDvemm~nt, m the m-er of the wiU of 
dae dhq masses, has *ed nwex to let dip a single o@ty 
hr ePsing in any way du burden of mamum d world edicts p m e  
ing upon the m h g  masscs thc world over. Taking this the Soviet 
Government darned a i  the Genon Gnfmmw to brhg f o d  dsc 
q n d o n  of geaeral disarmameat. At the hszmre ( h k n c t  it d e h d d  
tfie principle of dosing the Straits hr wac8hip% che r e d  of which weald 
ham bcen a diminutiw of the cttnnces of med d m  at s a  and the 
&& of naval andmaim.  A &a1 w&mm was caamkcd at 
1 From The UtdBA m d b ,  pp. 126-128. International Mtb, 
N m  k k ,  1 9 ~ 9 .  
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M o m w  by &Soviet G o v a m m t w i t h n d ~ S r a t t a  hr the  
ptrrpose of tiimulmeaun m u d  r c d w t h  of -6 and the ra 
sponBibility hr the &lure of this mdwmcc lia in im endmy at cttt 
doors of tbc arher partiapaats. 
Whileinwdegrcegoingbackuponia#dmdecoPhe~c 
o f N a t i a n a , t h e S w i e t C ; o v e m m e a t i ~ m d y m t c g o r d t f i c ~  
c m h m e  as a meeting of r v m t i v a  of kd iM!h ta~,  w t e  
c h c i a e h a t # r e P i a o f t h e s e S e a m c o m p " d a h ~ ~ o f  
Natim. The Soviet. Government herehe  q r c m a  im eatite teodinw 
w take part in the aforesaid a w b  h i c p k a  of w b  it L 
d e d  by h e  Govcmment of the Unittd Sma of tbe i n h m a  
of &c &st confereacc naval disi-, or by my & of 
powers. The Swia Go-t, moreover, croaaidas d m  wi&m ohe 
gartiaption of Russia and her dies the bctr#bmardowd amkma 
will be mmbgIe88, since the me~rwres pioporwd by im trit;.mm cpa 
only be arid out with chc p;utiapation of dl Smm mqnh.  
Therefme, although she agcndn of the a- d y  
menrim rnemkers d t h c  awdled Lcsgne d N a h i ~ ,  tbc &via Govern- 
mt considers that the participation of Rn& Pnd heE db, lila tbat of 
d other ' S ~ C S  at &the n b d m e d  mnhmq is khbh a d  
CSKaltial. 
. . . . T h e S o o i e t G w c m m a r t h a s s y ~ y ~ c g # t b e  
qacsdon of disymuneat dddtdy and proeticplIy f m n u b d  Im m- 
dcovours have, bo-, always moolmwed d e m m h d  rcaistPwre $um 
d e r  States, The W e t  E o v e r n m d c  d y  oae #r dmw in d d a  its 
will to pee snd d' r--was not a d m i d  00 ttm mshiqtm 
~ ~ ~ ~ e o f : g z r - r p ~ t , d e m r t e d t o q n & m o f ~ c  ' "  2ofmd 
armamentdo. The proposal of g m d  d i s a m m a  made & Swict 
d & g a d a n r o t h e G e n o a ~ ~ n c e o n ~ p r i l  I& rgii,wwrtjccffdby * 
&t Confereace. Degw this opposition, the Soviet C tbaanmer 
relaxed in its determined edemom~ with q a d  m & : . .  .h 
Decank ~ g a a a C m f ~ m c e w ~ d a d m M ~ ~ b y : t h e ; ~ ~  
ment, of repwarnti= of the border Stam hr eha joint of the 
p b l e m  of p ~ ~ a l  eurr ilment of armmum. Tht GupELp- 
mmt agreed to a &&able dimhution of its ammmta dmpite the 
TPa that this would nor affect many grmt Powers almys d y ,  wherher 
d m  the obligation of treaties or not, to o ~ n e  to the assistance of the 
other countries represented at h e  Moscow Coakrence d d d  rhtst be 
indved m &as- with tfie Soviet Sute. A defiaiee &me  for the 
limitadm of armnments was p r o p a l  at d w  Conferetlce by the Sovier 
Gwmmat. This schane was, however, rejected. 
Despite tfie +d & d e  of the Govmmmt of the Union of SocliaI- 
ist Soviet ReplbIics towards the laburs of the'hgut  of N k s ,  it 
accepted the i n v i m h  of Dccanber rzth, 1925, ro mcnd the oorninp. 
Dimmmmt Codamet, and d y  the SovietSwiss #w&ct, evoked by 
the assassinah of M. Vorovsky, M i a i m  Plmiptathry, d the 
daquent  q u i d  of the asasins by dx Swisr v t e d  the 
Union of Sodatist Soviet Rqmblia h n  attadq the p&ms session8 
of the P r c p a o r y  Cwnmissiml. 
In now mding its ddegatim to tfie fourth session of rfie Pqammry 
Cammission on Di-r, rtre Govanmart of dre Union of Sodalist 
Swiet Repblim has anchorisad it to presmt n acheme br pd d 
o~mpIete dimmanat. 
11. The del&w of the Union of k id in  Met Repnblia is anthoz- 
isad by its Gwmmmt a, p m p e  the a m p l e  abolition of all I d ,  
d d a i r i r c a .  
The Govmmm of the Union suggcsrs the Tollowing fw the -- 
dsatim of this propod: 
(a) The dimlutian of dl Id, sea and air i t m a  a d  h e  n o d m i t t a m  
of thdr aim in any concdd form whatwcr.  
(b) The d h a n  of all W-, milimy supplies, mmns for c h d -  
cal h e  sad dl d e r  forms of mmmmt and m e ~ l s  of d k  
in the po~o~cssion ofvoo or in militpry or P" Y-. (c) The mapping o all wars and mi 'tory air v d .  
(d) The d i d -  of c k g  up d t h s  far militpry mining 
either in armies or public bodia. 
(e) Mslatiw for the abolition of miliwy service, eirhtr mqdw, 
volumry or reanited. 
(0 Lcginlption pmhibijdog me di  op of minrd -a. 
) The demdon of fomems d naval and air bnstsi. 
) The scrapping of military @a aud factories Pnd of war i n d m  
equi e a t i n ~ i n d u s t r i a l w c - r k s ,  
(i$* d i d - c e  of .s ' ' fuudr fbr military plrpops bOm 
r n ~ t n r e b o d ~ d h ~ c o f ~  L bodies. 
(k) The abolition ofmilitary, navd and air ministries, aad the d i d *  

d m u  dmid hdumia susceptible of bdng rapidly convcrwd m 
pmpoa~s ia %am having a highly devdopd d i e m i d  bdumy, 
'+ ~ b a v e I n i d ~ y o n o u r p ~ o f ~ m e n t , b n t r d i s e  
@itsrodiFoj.aadexhn&nnmremayrnPkcit~ntrhehgI~noe 
e m p k  di5cult of realisation d perhaps cven Utopian. This, however, 
- aePted ns a forbiddm wrbjcct and n e m  yet dmmgldy d d t  with. W e  
dermd perfidy chac h e  &tiaP of rhla paogrammt may not bt 
- oDmpatible with cettzia political iweresta, ehidy h s e  of t31~ grat 
Powm,&iaterestilofwnr~tsorthoseofrhe~nneroa~groups 
'Z conaetBd that in itself the problem of oomplae dis- 
preseats no didkuldm snd b q a U c  of rapid a d  q solt~tiou. 
It is in my crsc s g m t  deal wimpla, d would + k lm time 
m work oat in daail, d m  tht &ma which have so fat bten d os a 
, bask for the work of the Pmpratory CWPmi88im. I oa 
; e c q p n i p t i n g m y d f w i t h & c ~ a o f t h i s ~  '*m,Xwasaglwtat 
tt# mplexiry, coafudan nnd multiplicity of the q u k r  with whi& 
d m  Ofdismsment had btoome inwlved. Tht Gommiasion b, in cffecq 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 b h t d ~ s i O n o f t h c m n m a r a t i o n P n d ~  
' of the dauw to rnake up an international Catlvdm ibr limimrian of 
ammmt8. Unanimity has d y  tea Pchicved wih rqmi to cemin 
aivial ond ocwnman points, The ovcrwhehmg majority of the chm- 
. or rather their heading-kcd &&a wbich hwe so fsr W 
be r-ed either by the thmisaion i d o r  by private a c g o & h  
bcrwem h e  Govmmmm concerned. If d whea, homer, thw dis- 
scnsions bve been remded, the Commission will st i l l  only be at d ~ c  
d m h l d  of ifs real diilidtim. The Cwnmission will have m agree to h e  
cs md d e r  @a1 fcpmrc$ b&e the l d  
amammu, milimy d air m d ,  m., can 
be establishad 
T h e m t r e ~ o f t h e s c q u e a i a m w i l l ~ c e t o b P i n g b & n s  
rhe llaer h o p e l e s s l l e s ~  the U*arn--ofExpacdag dris *on 
to be eohred within my b g k b l c  period. 
The loresr m a d a t d m  of iatematiod l i fe ,  h s  internathad 
~ e s ~ t l y c o n c l n d e d ,  l e a d n o t w f h t ~ o n b m r n r h c r i o t h e  
! ' still ~~ &visiQn of dle Ervopwn and aan-Euqwlu muuoitai inao 
politidgmuphgs,dtn&tiateti~moftheirmnmalmmgoni~ 
d d o ~ d o r d & e ~ g r o n n d s f o r ~ o s t o t h e o t l ~  
of dle qnestim b e h  tht Pqmramy Commission. 
rn 
One thing is cerraia: if tfte p ~ a t  kJa of ,he P w  Comml&
honb work ia not dmgd, it i ~ c n  if os cxplded by duz abmtdPnee 
and weight of its own i a d  d i f f m M d  tom. if ~ Q T  , - 
dtcda, of work either completely Mt or prOaaaivc of cpia h q i b l e  
rcmlts. 
Wk live in a time in which the out- of h h  w m  is ao mere b 
mid danger. ' i l i a  is not merely our opinion; m y  mpmsible 
inapirrlise~haw#thes~mef&mquiteiboeatfp.'lhc 
imminence of war irr mPking i d  Mt -. If it ir to k a m  
~ w i l t h m t o b e d o a e . I n o u r o p ~ t h t ~ g w r a a t # o f  
security for dl ppk Pnd all 4 e a  is immediate compleee dhmw 
mene. This problem sboutd k faaed hmmdhttly and s o l d  m the shortest 
possible time. Those ~ ~ r m t x k u  posrponing the s o h ~ h  of this p B l e m  
a r e t a k i n g r r p o n ~ s e l v a a n e n o m t a u 6 ~ b i l i ~ . ~ ~ b e g  
m move aa Wf of the Soviet delegation the LIIowing d t i a n :  
Wherm rhe +mee of ormamen# d he oeadcncy they Bbow ro 
g r o w t h b y t t v E i t v e r y n a t u r c ~ d d y I m d t o ~ r m e d ~ b a w c m  
nations, divedy the workers d pmmts h pe;tceful p d d v t  
lab- d brhgq in i# ppin countless dimmers; 
Wherc~s armed fom is P w q m n  in dre hpnds of grat Powm for the 
s i 0 n o f p d a p l e s i n d a u d a d o d d e s ; a a d  
% * e h e + e n b o l i d o n o f r r m P m c o e i s r t p r r w r ~ ~  
r e P l m t s n s d k d r g ~ m d a f f o r d h g a ~ t c e ~ ~ t h s  
mbrd of wu; 
The Fourth =on of  ti^^ Prcpamary Cornmiion Eor b Dkm. 
mmt rwIoe8: 
(I) Toprocedimmdhdy a o t h c m r k h g m m d d o f a & &  
Canvmtion for caq lae  and 
e Delegation of C ~ n t o a  of Socialist Soviet 
tk comocption, not later d m  M d  
anaommt Gdaa~ce for the dimmion d d r m k  of tbe propah 
provided for ia paragrap (I) .  
~ a r c f r ~ l ~ a w n r c t h a t ~ ~ e d l d l ~ t o ~  
~ t d ~ I n h a s p ~ d P . ' W e o r e q u i t e r e o d y ~ ~  
t b i s W c u g e a t m d d c d P r e t h p t w e p e m P k i a g p ~ ~ ~ ~  
~ o o o t i D o e t o & s w . I f r f r e P q u r a w r y ~ S o r & ~  
meat Cdcmcc ir not o miable plm in which to makcperscs 
d m  appprclltly we src here under a mi- 
~ ~ d h a s a l w p ~ ~ a ~ i u t e p c c p l i c y  
~ i t ~ d w y s s h a w a , d i a d ~ , m ~ p s w c l l * s i n  
d. Only a few days ag~, whm rhe dads of war seaaad to bE darken- 
~ t t r e b , o t i a o a o n t h e w s t b f ~ ~ ~ s l y d l a n e p a , ~  
m i t s ~ ~ h ~ & e S w i e t ~ t m a w a ~ c y . I t  
~ d p o ~ t d e ~ t o b e a r n p n t t m c Z b h P l i a n ~ t  
a w ~ d i e ~ a e l y f o d a d ~ r r & e d a o f t h e ~ o f w ~ r  
beewcen Lidma& and Poland. rite %& Gwmmat wm also h- 
d i n ~ o d i a g f i M s & t a t o n ~ b w u ~ a , o f f e r & e m  
advia, nnd mps were also mkcu by it in %maw tending m w d s  the 
~ o f ~ . T h i s ~ p f i e y o f m y ~ ~ t ~ ~ w a  
~ r i g h t t o ~ a r e & t ~ ~ ~ l l l o c ~ a ~ l e o p p w e u n i t y e l i p h  
- AmmDlx G h m  Dmmmmm CowmmN SmMrmD BY TUE 
hzuxl-m OF ~ t f e  UPmw w S O M m  SOVLBT RISPUBLm (FmUvARy 
' 5 ,  ' 9 ~ 8 1 ~  
DBAFI -?4 FOR MMEmAns, OOPdPlgTE Aun 
GEWEILAI; D- 
B t l n g h t e d b y ~ h d e s i r e m ~ f e g u P r d g m e r p I p e a c e ;  
~ c r i n g t b a t t h e ~ a n d ~ t o f a r m c d ~ ~ m t e  I 
p n ~ d m g e r , a n d ~ ~ t a b l y l w d t o h & r P r m e d d i ~ ;  ' 
C a a e i d e E i n g t f i n t ~ p t o g o t m d s e p l y i n w d a c q n ~ a u d t o  , 
~ i u d d ~ k r e E o a i a g c a t h e e x i ~ d ~ 0 f  
~ h a v e t d d i n f a i h o r h ~ t x e r c c a r d e d ~ d n d o n o f d i ~  
laeat qacstions: 
b, n l e ~ ~ s t n t a  '. . . . . . . . . . . .  I . . . . . . . . .  _ 
3 0 . . * . . . , . * , . . . . .  0 .  . . . a  
~ y ~ ~ t h o t t h e o n l y m r t m t t h o d ~ c h ~ c o n t r i l m t c  
m t h e ~ o f ~ i s o h e g d d  c a q l m n b I i t i ~ d o f a l l  
334-339. 

- &ide+ Wirtriaoneyeatfromdlecaayinmf;oreoofthe~t 
. ' ~ d ~ u ~ t o P h e m g ~ 8 a t i a a o f P r n w d ~  
k e, alI mo%tion mmmm shall be prohibited in fa*ut, 
ArricIej. ~oofour~asfmnthemuyinto-hofthepmmt 
it Bball bF permiibIe, in d c c  with a qmhl am- 
% d m , r o m a i n r a i n ~ ~ , d , ~ d ~ ~  
rn the exmt srricdy nccamty for the a p p l i h  of the d d m e ~ s n r t s  
r c q D i r c d b y t h e d i ~ ~ t o f t h e d  b, a u d b y r h t ~ c c  
of the m a r y  Pdminisaative and ammmic work xdatmg to dimma- 
mmr. 
Ankle 6. AU die film 1cmcembg the disbdamt of ~ I C  a d  hca  
$ r P 1 1 b e f o r w ~ e d m t h c ~ M i n i s r r i c B ~ f w a y a r a a e f b t h e  
m r y  iato h e  of the pment ChvalthL 
W &fil:cs and archim of& Miniam& ofMb, Marine and A k k ,  
of the Army dcg d of the staffs, ~~ instimth sad c m b W  
mmts, shnZl bt dcmmyd witbin dx epne period. 
M e  7, The pen#mnel of rhc d i ~ d a d  emsed forces a6ell k 
p m v i d e d w i d ~ ~ t i a a c h e r s p h e m o f ~ M d e # m o m i c ~ k .  
Until they are provided with mploymeat they may be pFoviddy . . mmmmd at phe e x p w  of the geued Smre bndga. 
m m ~ ~ p e ~ ' ~ n r e ~ w a r d c d ~ b m s c d ~ t f i E ~  
d y e ~ r s o f s a P i o e , r h e y e s r s s p e n t i a m i l i t n r y s ~ ~ ~ b e ~  
PI pmt ia, the service sf the Srate. 
Attiden. ' fhe~rsnss ign# lTot theopkcepof t t I ePrmed~  
bhche~badaaorontofohefrmdsof tht  V p r i o p l s d a .  
beconfined tot4&n~ s & t I y ~ h r r f i e ~ e t p o f t h e &  
b o r a # r r e m P i n i n g i a d m i l i t a r y ~ h r r x o r d a n e t w i t h o ~  
m&. 
W i t h t r ~ y ~ t h c b o d g * r ~ r h e n p k c e p o f t h t d ~ m o s t  
b e o b o l i s h 4 d m n y n o t ~ d ~ ~ n y h e a d i a g h t h e ~ ~ .  
Article 9. W1dh a P.r;d of cat y w  from the etlmy into f k c  of the 
present h v t n h i ,  d laws concpming d i a r y  d e e ,  daher com- 
pulsory, voImmy or by recnridng, atdl be a h q s t d  
IIhcdt. ionrsofd~iathedfnrcesnrrddlccompIetionof 
o D e a l ~ ~ k l p i d d o w n i ~ r e ; y o l a d o a s ~ d o f ~  
mtreedng SFaCes. 
M c f e  10. Immedidy Pfbet the entry mm fbtee of the presene Coo- 
m~chcfollawingsfdlbe~biabdbyhw. 
I.  S@d military plMicPtiolls: 
@) Sden&c restarch ad -4 &m; 
(b) Wrks on military history; 
(t) Mznnah of military cmining; 
(4 Milimy regnlauons; I 
(el hlamwlS of all kinds hr the saady of the mcpl 
of war. 
2. ~ e r n i l i t a r y ~ ~ o f t h c ~ ~ ~ ~ q p o f  
mined reserves, and military propaganda atmag the pphh. 
3. Themilimyaoiningofyoungpeop~deberbptheSrotec#by 
pablic weoeiak. 
Arddc 1 1 .  Wid& we yearofthemuyinm h o f t k p m t  
Convemim, the r a m  of arms, ammunitioa a d  orha h a w m u m  OF 
~oament aod desmctim enumerated Idow d at the dispoeal of che 
U s m y  of War shall be d m y e d .  TPnkm, war ma&ah d 
the applimc#r by which these materids are d i h d  @ peojemm, 
pulveristrs, bdhm and otfiix apparam), in d a in 
reserve, Shd &st be degtroyd. 
Tbe arm midy n a m y  for drc eff& r a m b i q  widi &c 
wlms may be r&cd by the m e d  fbrm of each of rSIt 
States. Tlie ppordofl bawecn the armed form of Earh Stnw and cht 
quantity of redmid implemmts- of war . . . hpl h E - ' ( in a 
Bpadal crmvencion. 
h e h t ~ d , ~ a a d ~ y ~ ~ a s f r w n t h e ~ i a a d ~ O f ~  
present Caalvmtioa, ohe d d  of all rfie t y p  of amwmcac ahan lm 
a r r i ~ d w r t b y ~ ~ v e m g a i n ~ r o p o r t i o a m f h c ~ o f  
permd. 
A h  the ownplecioa of dinarmammt in ePch d the 
' 
the rniDimum quaudty of m s  mi ammunition r e p i d  fm dl kinds of 
police f;orces d for personal use m y  be ralimed,m amdame wih 
39,43 Md 44. 
Part 2,-Naval Amraments 
Article 17. Within one yesr of the m m i q  iam ha of the prwcat 
Cwveatb, dl apital ships, cmims, P i r c f a r t ~ s  d sa* 
Bh dl be withdrawn from the nard esmblisbm~~t8. 
Arddc 18. All other 4 8  and f l h g  mmid cmrmtuffed fw the 
- w e o f  a u . . . ~  e t w i r h l u v d r i m s f t , s ~ k k v i t h  
drawn h the d e s t n b l i h t s  widh h years, wibhdFawal 
~ i u e q u n l p d y w r , i n ~ r y w i t h a s p i s l c o r t -  
wtltion. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Pact 3*-AirAmamenuS 
M e  z 3. During tlw first p~ of the annhg into force of tht pram 
thvqtipa, k v y  bombiag h a &  t o r p h m i e r s  and ~ b l ~  ahdl 
b c ~ f i r r m t h c a t f o r e e ~ .  
Ardcle y. All other miIicpry a h d k  not m m h e d  m M c l c  23 
aime and whidt, by rewm of &eir s+hUy military properti- 
aumt he used fm social or d c  p r p a  ahdl be h y d  within 
fm y e ~ r s , ~ u i o n ~ i n e q n n t p a r t s ~ y e u , i n c 6 n f o m i t y  
with spedPl tccfmid nrrpngcmulm. 
AItkIez j .  W i t h i n o n e y ~ o f t i i e C M n i I l g ~ m f w c e o f ~ p ~  
~ a l l s r t o c k s o f ~ b o m b s d M f i e r w a p o n s m ~ m  
b a d i s J l a r g a d h ~ f t d d l b e ~ .  
M d c z 6 .  T h e ~ c o f t h e ~ t o f m ~ m y ~ w h i E h a r e  
m b t ~ f o r d o r d ~ ~ b e ~ d ~ y e d  
ar&dofhoe~b&omdtedmtofthdrwi&~wdhtbePir 
~ & e e t m e s . S a c h a i & f t W ~ h h a a d e d o v e r t o & ~ #  
d d  t q a u h a h .  
Article r j .  A l l t h e ~ ~ ~ t b e a c t i v e a i r f o r c e m r r s r b e  
d i & n s w d g s d a i r a a f f w h i e P l p r e b ~ o r u a d c r c r m ~ &  
o a o r d c r s g i v m m t h e ~ ~ t r y o r ~  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Rut +-Fodl&ms d I3asei3 - 
M e  19. Within three yepre of rhe eatry ~IUO force of the pamt 
- Coct~tion,16c~leofhhcmtoffora-dahcrMd 
I ~lrorko d o f n w a l d  air* bma s l d  b&dclirrm con- 
% h n i y w i t h n h ~ ~ i n a ~ c o n v e n d o n .  
!, Dpringthehllowiqgwr,the~rmamerrt~beremovtdPaa~ d t h e ~ d i m d d d ~ ; i t & d i u f m m e b c  
5 ~ t o e o n ~ l m e w ~ e d w o r k ~ o f ~ y k i n d .  
F! 
Part ~.--Armnma# h b d e l  
ArdcIe 30. With the entry iwo ha of & p m t  Gmunim, an 
S t o r e P n d p p i ~ ~ e r m d e r m k i n g s s h d l ~ r o ~ a y d t h e n l m a -  
menm e a n m d i n  the fist auuexuimkride r r  wsmyof&seme0- 
tiondin Ardcle 1p,a3, s 4 d a s ;  p ~ u h a U b e m d e m a ; m v c r t  
~ ~ i b r p m p a o f ~ ~  
U p l d I t h t a e ~ s ~ ~ p @ f o r p t p a e s f p l ~ o a m n i l  
t k m k t r s i n ~ ~ r c P k i a g s k d o m d e m p E o p a * l r e i n ~  
~ ~ , ~ w o t h s h p l l k s o ~ b y t # E ~ - ~ ~  
p m d c h r ~ r o q u i r t l l K n t s o u t o f t h e d e f t n c e ~  
h k k 3 1 .  ~ d l C f i r ~ ~ f o l l ~ b ~ h $ r e r r . d t &  
~ ~ o n , e h e ~ s , t e ~ a p p m m a d ~ ~ # b  
ammmt induslries s t d l  be destroyed. 
Article.32. W 1 d r i n t u r o y c m o f t h e ~ * f m e & & ~  
~ ~ ~ r d ~ s w ~ i n t h c ~ -  
19, 23,24 2 5  a 
Article 33. It &all 
e r P c t i n g ~ M b t a u t h v r i 6 e d  
- \ 
4 Pam 1-Protdm on h d  
Artidc 37. Tht tffcctives of rfac Clratoms @, had phot aud 
: forestd&rpards+incs&ofthcontractiagStntes,nndtheamormt 
Of=-t,shaUnotforaperiadofrolup.earsafiw:thtooPldasion 
o fdre~sen t~a t iop1exaedtbem~lrberdamwmtpso tJwunry  
rer, 19~8; thee effeaiw ahdl not be organbed m sach a way that rbcy 
- e a a b t u ~ f o r w a r ,  
M e  38. OnbexpiryofhpcridoffollryearslniddownhthF 
, p&nt  &mmtron €or effeaitrg copnplete and p;userat d h m m m q  d~ 
mimmnee of a proteetme d @ice service, the permme1 of which 
&dl be q a g c d  by volnnmry awrtmcw of &, &all be a t d o r i d  
m the territory of tach of the conaaedng b s ,  for tlx pur- of 
and re- police snpervision, i n m d  poiice and ~ IC  prc#eetion 
d Sma~ and private w, the mount of w e q m  d simple arma- 
mtnt d y  aeass l ry  m y  a h  be r h d .  
The efiaivemss of these q r i e r  of servietr &all bC hid down in a 
@aI erramcia ad &dl bc proprtionate 00 the p p h i o n  of the . 14 00nmuiq Stam, ttrt length of he mans of d&the 
exiaenceof&~wki&mdeanedbyrheSmemrequirtprotaeeim, 
' tbededopmtoffbrrsay, wc. . . .  ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  
Part 1 . - ~ m  at %a 
Ardde 40. On h e  atpiry of h e  period of fonr y e ~ s  Iaid down in tbe - pr&m &QV&on fol & d u g  complete Pad pld i i i ~ c n t ,  a 
mPritime police d c e  &dl be orgadmi which shrill c x m k  io ~ 0 0 , s  
g 
. , ia cmhnity  wid^ a special avmtica d which is ineeadcd h r  the 
~ ~ 0 0 o f d l e n a n a a l ~ e t s o f t h t ~ M d o f 8 u ~  
@ Pd a b l a , t b r ~ o f p i r r s y m d n d f m C a L v c a n k , ~ ~  obieps x v w h i e h q ~ a y i n h n m h t h e w b p o f ~ d ~ a n t h e  
d high seas. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
BiOelof~aaI, ~ ~ o f ~ i a d l o f d l c ~ ~ ~  
and IoePl Cmnmisioas. of ConmI. 
Artide 46. The Permmat I + 11 Cbnmusuon . . of- 
id beaimmed with: 
(a) The Supemisinn and control of the nomroI aud pqmbd PPQB~~BB 
of disarmament, with the g e n d  d t h  of mmimw hr 
out the provisions of the ~ e n t  &wmb, d witfi &e 
to each Stace of against its stipdwim; 
(b)Theprepar&caofanagwunmefarbringiagprrssonbyaulp. 
m i l i t a r y r n e a o m c s u p m y s t a r c s w h i e h d i s m b d x e d ~  
of dirarm~mrnt as hid  dowm by the presat C o a e  ad- 
wpplememary tberctcr; 1 
(c) The selccdon of hditk, the prodme rmd h tddd ororrdf- 
k s  forthedesarrction ofmaterid, n n d r h e ~ o f d t , ~ ~  
snry suppiaaeatary techid agreanats; 
(4 IIhedeczionofcent~esforthemnrmfacmreof~dye~ 
of d mamSacmrc and tbe regulation of the wade in ~ n a ;  
(c) 7he pblimtim of in fodm mmmhg p r  h 
of di t. 
Ardde 47. The Permmat Inrerustbnd Cammissioe of: CPettal 
shall masist of au equal number of reprtsamha of dw l&bWm * 
M c s  and of the trade unions &d ocher workmcn*~ mguWm#& dl 
&c htcs +cipbg in the prcmt Cammtion. 
k, the Pumaat  International Commisaioa of &md may b 
q p l e m d  by 'cpraumtivcs of i n ~ t i m a l  mwdzha b n b  
i t ~ t o ~ t a b l i s b ~ c r d a b b e n v e e n S t p ~ p a d ~ ~ ~  , 
this aim with meccas, pvided &at chcse organhatimu q r M- - 
to participate in tht work of the Permanent b e m a t i a d  GDmmiaah of' - , 
Coaml. 
The of the Permanent htamationd Commission of M ' . , 
be at.. . . . . . . . . . . . . o* 
Arddc 48. The P - t  hematima1 Commissh of d d  - - .  
be assisted by a Pmnauent btcrnational M t t e c  of Expctts, 8 8 
mistkg of an tquPl mnnbcr ofmilitary, naval, air d Mhcr expetts 54 
iag m dl the Srnrcs amdug m the presmt Coa~e~rion. 
Article w. The Permanax I n m a t i d  
act d e r  the orders of the Permanent 
ld; it shrill give opinion8 and shd! d d  d 
paesrioas referring to the exemtion of the pra 
Adele 50. The Cornmiion of Gmml in epeh of 
e of qlmentatives of dtt *t h m n a h d  
&E -* -vt8 of ~ M C  w e -  
prsd w 0 r b 1 #  orgad?dm, Md of mpmmmhw 
d d t f i c d d b l e o f t h e d f r r r c e r o f d a e ~  
b M - o f - 1 .  
shalIbFtfsta*ofttteStnte 
~ a o n f o m t t y w i t h t h e ~ t ~ v e m i a d m a c o o p d a a c e w i t h  
& e ~ o f ~ P a m a n m t ~ G o m m i ~ o f ~ *  
Plxc idt5a .  ' I l s e M ~ e o f b 1 s b P l I o o a s E s t d m p -  
mather of d u p d  d peblic q m i s a h ,  wde onions d work- 
meo's w&6msL and of r e p m m r i v a  of the pens~nm d of & rank 
~ ~ ~ D ~ ~ Q c M  
~ ) ~ ~ d ~ P m d 0 6 c i a b d t h c ~ m i w 1 o f W ,  
Msciw d Mititnry A M m *  
(6) ~ w d e n l o f m d ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ r m d e x -  
. ~ , ~ ~ f d h r g e ~ ~ s m b a n l d n g a d ~ c d  
~ a w i t h ~ i n ~ ~ d t h e w i n ~  
. d ~ ~ i n d o l l ~ .  
H t 5 5 .  W ~ # m r P n e t i n g ~ ~ ~ k m g i ~ & t f f i d e s t  
p l b l i e i r p t o $ l e ~ o f d i r ? ~ ~ a Q d B k a l l ~ t t a c ~ o f t b F  
' ~ t ~ d G . m r m i s a i o n o f ~ ~ w p ~ ~ ~  
' f p l l ~ c a d d l a u i t i t s o f ~ S c m , o f ~ c ~ d n f  
ptivPte pmms wkda are with &e appliaion of-
x l r ~ i u t h e v i e w o f d i e ~ ~ ~ ~ s $ i ~ f l o f  
~ o r i t s ~ g i . s e r k ~ d o a b t s ~ t 8 e o ~ m c c o f  
P h a ~ ~ y d i n m w i t f i r e g P r d m d i ~ d  :. - ~ ~ O f a I I m i l i r P r y ~ .  
Article 56. The d & h  of h Perrnona~t Iammid -data 
o f C o n m l ~ b t a k e u  b y a m a j o r i t y ~ d ~ b t ~ o l l p I 1  
bhe caamtdng Smtw. 
Article 57. 'Ihe corn of mninaenoaa of dz Pcrmonent ~~ 
~ a n 0 f ~ 1 P n d i e s ~ $ ~ ~ ~ 8 t h e c g r e n a c s F c L t i n g  
to the work of control, shd be defrayed by dl h -&ten in a 
proportion m be d t d  in o epecial arnvendm. 
The qmm of the national d I d  
bt defrayed by caeb of the conua*dag Smm. 
CHAPTERV 
SUPPLE~~ENTAWY AGREEMENTS; a 08 TBE 
R A T ~ ~ ~ T I o N S  
Article 58. Wldin one year of the cnuy into force d tffe p& ':id. . 
Article 59. Within nine monrh 
Con-, the hIlowing mpwen 
(a) In aoPlformity with Am& 
v~ntiort on the nmnbtr of ds, 
muons lei? to each of the 
d general dhmammt:. 
(b) In concrmfiormiq with Artick 15 of the present t h v d m ,  
(F) In crrahmiry with Articles 3 4  35 and 39 of the 
a ooaveutim concerning the w a g e  and p d u c t h  
minimpm Wty of war m a d .  
V) In coaformity with 
v e n t i o n , a c w v e n t i o n ~ ~ a t ~  
n r c a s o f ~ a t ~ a n d t b e m n n b e r o f d  
police d W s  parpaetr. 
hying doffm die coastimdon of the Wmallult 
ofCopuo1 and o f h  orgaw, as well ns the 
~ d t h e c o m d ~ t h .  
(h) A convention q a d q  the -ar of &my pamc 
~ k r r k e n ~ ~ s d i m l i n g t b e ~ p r a g r e s s o f ~ ~ e n t  
aa pr&dcd for in ttst p e n t  CoaolendoPl d in ttbe s u p p b m y  
=P=--. 
Now-The Imemdad Commission of Coatml MI be respsiblc - for prrpngiog to mmmm the Sates p d d p c i o g  in rbe p r m  Gmvmtiaa 
m a hibenee  for dtt m c l ~  of d the WPpIun~~my cmmdms 
d a d  in the pmmt articlt. 
W c l e 6 o .  I n t h e m s e o f o d i x e c t ~ o f t h e p r e w m ~ t i o n  
by ax ofdie conuoeeing stam, an clraPordinnry ps8embIy of tbc repre- 
d m  of the c o m d q  S a c s  pdupting in tHe pmsmt Convention 
~ b e ~ a s u p t d i t i o a s l y a e ~ M c b y & e P e ~ I n c u -  
~Gmmi~mof6nfroIto&eidtrrpoothempambe~. 
I I T b e ~ p r ~ h t o ~ p r e ~ n m p c m b e o f o m i l i e ~ r y c h , ~ .  
All disputes ktween StPtes &dl bt d e d  by the Pcmmmt later- 
. m i o d  Commissiw 0 f G n d .  
Ardde61. ~ p a e m t ~ ~ e n t c r i a m f b r c t a s ~ i #  
d a t i o n  by all the States in d t y  with tfae leddhvt praetia 
of& of the coaaaccing States. 
M d t 6 2 .  I n ~ t o ~ t b e a m t u d e t o b t n k e n i n r e g o r d t o  
!bets not ratifyi i  thc pmm C o n e ,  the contraeeiag S m  shd 
..... mvem a world Congtesa in the momh of.. ............. ,892..  
at. ................. 
M c l e  63. The ~ o o f r a t i 6 c o d o n ~  bedrawntrpin6ve 
0Op;es and &all be defited in rhe apid of me of k Stms in the five 
cfnlhlmt~. 
'Ihe rat%& of the present Coa& in m h n i t y  with the provi- 
rioPlsofArricle 61 &dl btnotifitdtodtheoontrlcring States by ...... 
x. l h e  Oroft Qnvmdon on Gaacral, Coanplete ad I t m e d i m  Die 
srm~mcnt is &don the demuaim of b pain&@ e b r s  which fibrm 
~ n r m e d ~ o f r c ~ r m a y , ~ L m s a y , t h e o r g P n i d a m t t d f o r o c r  
oa~on~mdhintfmt,tfrdr~,d&eidns&scarmecPed 
with the produdm of ammmm. 
TbeDrPftCarwltntioafurdatrproPidesdut,atdiccxpiryofayenr 
P f W i m ~ ~ f D L O e , & l . m d , d , m d & f o r a r o f d d  
s h n l l b e r c d u o F d m a n , e s m ~ t w h i & w o d d b F d c s s h r ~  
tfius limitiug tht @biiity of arawd d c t ,  t r c ~  kt& 8' r 
haa bCM mmplcd. 
2 .  ThE DrPfe Conwmtiw~ mertly seu forth dbe gtntfPl prhciph of 
dimmamat applide to the d forces of all corm&?, w i h  
~ i a t o ~ d t t n i l s o f w e h , o a e h e ~ t i w t b a t , w h m t h e e s ~  
priudp1es have been ado& all dwee detda will be d d t  wjtb in a 
s u h q w t  d i m d m  of thc whoIe question of dimmmmt, 
Thus in any - t h  is no need to work om the d d  dct& tfiir 
being a mpttcr h a spadnl body to b set up tt# b 
come bar fora* 
3. ~ p t e r I o f t h e I ) r P f i 6 n & c m ~ t f r c ~ s o f &  
amamnt m far as theyate to effacdves. 
For dx &styear, it- for &cdis&rgcofhalftiud d 
h h m r  of o w  o5ciaIa, ad other d s ,  the &iqh ofmilimy 
~ ~ o f W i r , M n r i t a t d M i l i t ~ y A v i ~ m i l i m t y ~  
~ i a s t i m e i o n s a a d e w a b l i ~ t s , p a d , a t ~ t h e ~ ~  
~ & o f m o b i l i s o c i o n p l a t l s f o r t h e a r m e d t b r ~ ~ p r p d m k d ~ .  
3 y t h e s r e ~ a r m i ~ ~ n n d f l e e f a w i l l h r o d n c e d a o 0 c o r r d i t i w i D  
which dwy tady be used for attacks by om cumtry an &. 
what is left of dmn will be p i n u f l y  oocupied in e* E' rt 
i n ~ w i t h t h e & ~ ~ o f ~ ~ , w h i c h m q u h ~ e e L t O b l  
pmonat of p c c m d  fop kinds of m k .  
I n t h i s o o n n a e e i w , ~ t i o n s ~ ~ ~ o f d  
r o r e c s f b r ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ h l * 8 t ~ 0 f d i ~ a r c l o o k c d o p m o r  
domestic qnesdws for web vq 
h regards Prmies optwed on the Wrrimrd system, with d 
&s periodidly supplemad by variabIe t f f O C d ~ ~ ,  d i m  
~ b t d o u r o a t h e s s m e p r ~ l e , n a m c l y , ~ o t t f w e e d o f ~  
h y e a r y o p a c e n t o f ~ w d r e s m d ~ o p e r c e a t o f t h E ~ ~  
i n c l d  in the variable e&ct im will be didwgd, 
F0rtherest,CbspherI0ftheDnftGn~enrionc8evtlopsdtsplains 
in detaiI the proposals put forward by the US5.R. d e k c p h  at the 6 u d  
~ s s i o a  of dlc h p a w r y  Commission for rhe Dimmmmac -. 
4. Chapter z w & s  the most hn-t proPiaiona & 
dcm& of m d :  
(a) Thh chapter again b l a  with r h  principal of dir 
d n r i n g t h t k s t ~ ~ c t i o n o f n I l w c m ~ ~ ~  

~ d e s a n c t i o n o f h W p r ~ 9 8 ~ 0 f w a r .  ~ i n t o m n a i d w a -  
t i o n ~ & a l ~ o f p i r c r ~ ~ o w o f m m a r m i ~ ~  
Drafr~~doesmtmakethedeaPaaionof&matarialesstntial  
todisnrmnmart,sinotsomtofthePircnft~arabecwmerPPdaogaciald 
emmi& uw; bm aa d m e  ia no great di- in 6aiq Pirernfl for 
h ~ , d m f i m c ~ n b e d o n e v e r y q o i c k l y , t h e a t l m B e r o f & -  
C F o f t h & a v i l & e e ~ a d m i a e d l y k ~ t r e m b o o r m a y ' s  
& n e ~ , d ~ s i s p w p i d a d f o r i n A r d &  t l o f & e I h & ~ .  
(g) F o r t i 6 ~ a d b a s c s m u s r b e d m m y d , ~ r b e y c ~ a b e . d  
a s ~ h r o g g r e s s i o n .  
(h) The q u w h  of rbe d e d m  of war iadusaiw t p d d a r I y  
cmnpliad, k u s c  a highly developed i d m y  m n h  gmat pm- 
l i a l f w r r e a b r c H e ~ & o f n r r n n m c n r e . ~ ~ ~ , ~  
a r e a m b u o f ~ ~ P p p l u a c e r b y t h e ~ o f ~ & c  
~ ~ f # I I M m U l t ~ ~ p n b E I M & ~ & & d t . T b e & ~  
drpwiqg~, nlmmiqg -ma nwkls, fmq Pooto Pad 
P p p l i a n a ~ ~ y b t s ' i f o r t f a e m n n u f n a m F o f ~ ~ F ~ ,  
t h e d ~ ~ f m i i i t a r y ~ ~ d d r r r a e ~ t b e m o r m -  
~ o f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + ~ m & ~ o f  
p l P n t r b P t i s n o r s ~ ~ y m i I h y , P n d t & e ~ o f ~  
n t a s s v p f w m w & ~ t i 0 1 1 8 , w i l l & i t a ~ ~  
m a e r e r t O ~ ~ ~ ~ 6 o r w a r p m p " e ~ .  
5. C h a p t e r 3 ~ w i r b t h e o g P n i ~ o f ~ d + i n & i a  
~ m & t o p m m x ~ a y p i b i l i t y o f o s i n g d e ~ h  
f o r m i l i m y p t r r p o ~ a r a n a ~ f o r ~ d m i l h a r p ~ ~  
es tnb l ih ts  of the plim f n r a s  or militia, g d m d c  d d h c  kids 
o f g u n b m m t b c k c p t & y w i t h i n t h e i r ~ ~ t h r a $ h o w t b t  
p e r i o d o f f n u r y c m p h a v i d e d f o r r h c ~ t i o a o f ~ ~  
Su-rly,hts~aU-ofdse-ond-@d 
l o d ~ e e w i l l b e f m c d b y a ~ p e c i a l a o a v m t i o a c a a s & ~  
t o ~ a t i o n , l c a g t h o f ~ a n s , p r o p a r y c b e ~ s a d  
-offoresay. 
P o l i c e f a m m o f c w y k i n d m s t ~ ~ w & ~ ~ o f  
the simplest p m  becanse, if a more w m p l i d  wue ra- 
& a d , I r m i & t b e a s i e r h ~ f b r m n k a t o b e d n e a P m s # I ~  
in amcks by mmpr npon d e r  d s ,  
M a v d ~ e i p g i s r e g a r d e d r w t a s a m a m r w b t B t a l t ~ ~ ~  
b y e n c h ~ , b o t # ~ ~ ~ ~ n e # l s o f o ~ ~ o f # r o o -  
tries, m h a t  it psibly be d 00 impcrialiseie d a .  
p o l i e E ~ d y b e p r o v i ~ w i t h ~ ~ B t r i e t l y ~ h t h e  
~ c e o f r h e i r ~ .  
~ ~ i t s ~ k ~ ~ d f o r t € l c m a i n m m c e o f p p r -  
i. ~ d a e t r l e a u y d i q m ~ t h a t m a y a r i t x .  
. , wl~~object,mpter4~fdu~Drnft~~yadDwntfle 
: -, h@cipks of h e  m n d  which ir b a d  opoa h *st reei-, hll 
; @My, d pudaph in the work by dmc h a e s  of& &tion 
- w h i c h m r c m o s t ~ m d i n c R e s p e e d y a m p k t i o n o f ~ ~  
As h i s  at prcsentia the w w l d n o a ~ w h a p e  ~ m w t  
b F o b e g e d b y d c ~ u n u i e ~ ~ ~ ~ t b e ~ n p a P e r m n -  
t b e w l o d w i l l P D d t k e o n s m t o f d ~ . T h e d ~ o f t h i a  " 
would k a guatamxc of the imprhlity of ik d e d k  md, 
, 
u obext amld be a Ginmime d 1 E x p  nmehcd m ir. a$nid qucs- - sions oould bt CiUicId~ d e d .  
7. , C h a p  ; &inn m m s  for the cudusion of- 
~ t i o m m v s r i o u a ~ ~ w i & d '  t, snd indi- 
c ~ ~ e s t h e ~ f o r r P t i f y i n g ~ a a n d ~ s n y ~  
Prising out of viohzimr. 
It is this p q m f  questions thar arc the mose c o m p l i d ;  but the Draft 
~ t i o n d o t s m t P l I o w o f a n y d i o t y p r c s m m b c i a g ~ t t o b e a r  
a m any cammy, h u e  such meawrrcr arc apt to five rise ao swims  
~ d c r s , p r s d i t i s h o p e d t b ~ t ~ - ~ & u s r r w ~ ~  
Pmrions to effect mplete d gmed dhmmmt &at d u  maas 
wiUd~~~befoundromnqdanycounmyseekingmPiolnttttreobligP- 
dgls it has a d  to & d q c  them faithfully. 
~ ~ x x & h ~ ~ ~ C m w m m o ~ m w R E D ~ m ~  
R: - R J m m c s d  
&dmqtbattbe immenscgrowthia ammmtn mdiumilitariam 
i m ~ a g a a v a l a a d h e a v y ~ o a t h e ~ e s o f ~ t n d f e ~ 0 1 : i d  
d lowers the l e d  of oh& eultare and duir mated  WelEbeiag.; 
. - 
I o f w a p n r  for m d m w  pad h a i w  milimy p p e s  are ow ofthe 
4.. 4 FW ehe f b ~  tat. w ~oro~iat .  E. A.. " T ~ C  USSA. d ~i-t" 





G e n e r P l A s s m b I y ~ t h c ~ o f a g m c r p l ~ o f  
ammmmts. 
(2) The implementing of the daeisim amtamkg rhe d m t h  of 
~namtnts W d  include m primary object the @ib m 
and us# Pmmic a~ergy for military p p ~ ~ .  
(3) The G a d  Asartmbly r e m m d s  dm the wry GDMeil 
s h o d  inme the & d w  imptemmting of fCPF pildplw hid down m 
paragraphs I and 1 b e .  
(4) The G a d  Assembly appeoIr to rhc Gmummm d d the 
S r o a s t o g i ~ t o d u ~ C o n n d o i l t h e a & w n # ~ t o  
enable it to d i s d q e  in mpsibiliriw arising ont of &a msk b 
d m m a ~ t  ofwhich lica within the mpe of im missioa m uzmW 
m padaring pnd main& M o d  b t y .  'Zbi~ d ' i s  dm 
in&intcrmofthepcopl~ who would b e d a d  b h l s e a v y c a o -  
~ b u r d m e ~ n s e d b y t h c e x & v e ~ t u r e m ~ ~  
& aoc to pe~eefbl p t w u  dtim. 
(I) With a view t~ mqthhg pace Pad intemncimdtl aeeatity m 
#mhrmity with the Pims and principles of h e  United N* dte 
General Assembly r c q n i m  the neccssiry of a d u c h  of 
amlamalm. 
(2) The implanmhg of the decision c o n a m i q  thc duc tk t  d 
a m a n m e 8  &dl incIude as primary object the prohibirioo. rn prodrta 
and use awmic eaergy for milimcy purpo9cs. 
(3) To i n m e  the of measnres for rhe rtdudm of nrrrrpmmrs 
and @bition oftheuseofatomic mxgy for militarypqmca, ehere 
shall be wtobtished widin the h e w o r k  of dsc e t y  Colmcit, which 
hpp the primary r e ~ ~ t y  fop intcmtimal p c e  d 4% 
hmnaioaal mwl opaadng an tfie h i s  of a s p e d  @a which 
should p v i d e  for he emzblishmeac of pp"id o r p s  of hm hr 
which p p c  there shd be h e d :  
(u) A anmission for the contx-01 of the execnth of che Gsiw tb 
garding the reduction of armpments; 
(b) A cammisdpioa for che a)nml of the exemtion of tht d c & b  
q a d q  the prohibition of& me of atcimic energy for miliq 
1. 
' X b d r a f t p a g q h a a s f o l l o w s :  
"As M essaidal step toward d~ urgent objective of china* from 
m W  PrmPment8 aWmiC wwpans and all Mhermapr w m p s  adapeable 
to mass desanaion, the G a d  Assembly urges the ~~ fu161- 
mmt by the M c  Enecgy Gmmkim of its mms of refkmcc as M 
k h  in sectioPl5 of the G a ! d  Assembly r d u t i o a  of J~lnorg 17,1946. 
Accordingly, in order to insrue that the gme.ral r e g d a t k  d d m h  
of mmme~8 are diread toward the major a f t p p  of mdem wprfnre 
d n o t m e r e l y t o w a r d t h e m i m x w ~ t b e ~  AesanMyreaom- 
mmC &at the Stnrrity +dl w t e  amhkdon of the r e p n  
which the Atomic h q y  Corrtmissia~ dl makc to the Senvity Conad 
&re 3 r b k ,  1946, a d  Wtnte the progress of the work of dwt 
commission snd also that he Seclrrity Conncil exPea;tc adderadon of a 
draft oo~lymtion for the prohibitioa of d e  weppws." 
,To add to paragraph 3 rhe following: 
"To inwre the adoptioa of for ebc rcducliaa of a m s m m ~  
md proh ib ih  of the use of ammic mergy for military pmposes thac 
ahdl be established within he h m v o r k  of the %aiy C o d ,  who 
bw the main respmibility for h d o a a l  pcaot and d t y ,  iarer- 
m t i d  e o n d  operating on &e ba& of a spacial piovisian which 
h o l d  provide h the es- of s p i a l  orgms of  in^+ 
w h i c h ~ t h u t d l d l k f m m a d :  
(a) A c d s s i o n  for the m 1  of u~~t ldoa  f the W o n  r e @ q  
the r e d u d  of amamcnts. 
(b) A cmd~sim fw: the umml of the cmmdon of the decision re 
~ t i i e p r o h i ~ t i o n o f t h c ~ o f d c e r ~ e t g y f o r m i l i t n r y ~ . "  
(I) With a view ro sPePgtharing i t e r p t b d  peace d b t y ,  in 
d t y  witb the purposes and phaIe~ of the United N a b  the 
GeaefP1 h b l y  rc+m the d t y  ofan early and general rcgula- 
t h  d redu& of armaments. 
7TkNm YmRTkppg lkcmk 5, tw. 
a Tk New York Ths, NOY& 29, z&. 
8s Fim* dy-m&wbd& 
N the &st step toward a gcaeral qdaioa d rednmm of prmpmmts, 
~ ~ C o r m c & w i ~ f m t t t t r d d a y , ~ m ~ w i r h  
m e m k s  of &t United N a k s  uuda h i d e  43 of tht Qmmr ctte 
q d a l a g r e m m m m a k m g a v a i I a b l t t o t t t e h d q ~ ~ i t s d  
t h e a r m b d f o r ~ ~ l n n d & ~ p i # m t X n n d ~ ~ ~ ~  
pvpose of mpintpining intcrnaticd pepoe d e. 
(3) Inorder r h a t a m i c w e a p s m d P U ~ m a j x ~ a @ m M e  
w ~ d e E m l c t i o n s h P l l b e ~ P e d f r a n n ~ ~ ~ t h c  
=liest pasihle date, the &nd Assembly urga ttre q & k a  M- 
~ t b y t h e A m m i c h q y C w a m i s ~ o f i m m & & d m o w n r o f  
rcferrnce set forrhinsoaion 5 ofthe G a d  AiwmIdy-of 
14 January, 1946, which &c cormnission is requ id  to e w &  be 
nrmost diupaach ad m make & fbllowhg @e e:
(a) For ex* k m c a  nll n a t h  rhe admp o f b o a i c ~  
hformndonfw*ends; 
( b ) F o r c a a t r o l o f a r o m i c e a e r g y r o r h e e r m t ~ t o ~  
n f = d y f w W p P = ;  -- . G v - . .  a m -  
eianal mmmiion of m d  with power m makc 
~ ~ T o t h c d ~ o n ~ ~ a t ~ t i o a o f d '  e 
~ b t ~ a a s w a ~ p o s a i b l t , t h e G c a c r n l ~ & r e c g n r m e p d a  
m & ~ & m d r h a t , w i i t h e & ~ 0 6 b M i t i w r p S t d €  
icmbmitplPnsatthe~liesepnaetieablcdmto&M~ 
- 4  o f d i c ~ ~ f m & c ~ ~ o f a ~ f o e t l w r c g & i i o n  
d ~ a f i b p v i k l f b r i n  Artidt r 6 o f t h c a t n m r . ~ ~  
~ b e ~ w d * t h e ~ * o r r r m a d a b  
eimemtimebpelzcAtclnieEQtgg(=lrmmi~. 
(7) The G m d  M U y ,  h h g  d e n t  &t tfie acooi-t of 
thmx o b j e c d ~ ~ d d h  @p m t b e u d d i b t  o f c d m h n  
peaeed&-ofhMsecnrity,aad,kfngooltd 
that h w d d m a k . c ~ ' M e  a ~ h t h c ~ o f l i v i q o f d  thepeopl#i 
o f ~ U n i t e d N ~ b y ~ t a i n g d x e ~ v y a c o a o m i c b r r P d o n i m p d  
~ t o p c P o e f n l p o s t w n t c o l a d i d o a s , ~ a p w l ~ ~ ~ ~  
ofd~m&every~e~fiirrt~luet#rthc~tyCormdt, 
& e ~ S B P f f C o m m i r e c e d t h e ~ P n m a y S ; o x l l m i s s h r o  
d c t b m t o s t & n ~ g t h e ~ r # t f w r f i i a r h i s ~ .  
h m m  H-UNITEQ STATES OP Ammm b81: Dmmmnm 
kd 
( r ) W ~ a v i m w ~ ~ p c a o e I r m d d t y i n  
~ t y ~ d l e ~ d ~ e s ~ f & U n i P e d N o t i o n s , ~  
h d ~ l d y ~ ~ ~ 5 i t y o f a n d y ~ ~  
d ~ o f n r m ~ t r a a ~ g . ~ y , t h e ~ A d y r t e o m -  
'2' ~ ~ d l e ~ c y ~ d g i v e ~ ~ t o ~ ~  
m b p n c t i d ~ ~ t o t h c i r ~ , w h h h n r c ~ & l  
m ~ f o r t h e p d r e g o I P t i o n n n d ~ ~ d ~ ~ p o r ~ t  
~ p ~ ~ ~ a n d a g ~ ~ a n d z o ~ ~ d ~  
d ~ w i l t b e ~ y o ~ b y a U p u d u p a n m a n d m r  
- m i l m r d y  by mne of ttPo pdipts. 
( a ) T h e ~ A a x m b I y ~ t b t ~ t i p l w t h c ~  
y l a i m  Pnd r&ah of atmamum is rtte w1p earn- d 
~ ~ o f a d t a ~ d o t f i e r ~ ~  
+ 8 i a i # w o F i c s m i n w Y t ~ U s e d ~ f i w ~ ~ * ~ y ,  
~ o P a e F t o h d m t & e g e n d ~ t i a a d ~ o f ~ ~  
m e ~ ~ ~ w a r d t h t ~ j o r w e a p s o f ~ ~ n n d n ~ m e r ~ l ~  
~ O B R R l t d h ~ w e a p o n s , t h e G e n e r P l h ~ M y ~ ~ t f i e  
Scmrity Cormcil give first c o a b t i a n  to repom wbich he A d e  
& u g y G m m i s s i o n w i l l & w t h e ~ t y C p l m c i l ~ ~ b a  
j r ,  ?++ti, and fadime rhe pmpm of &c work oftb~t anumi*. 
(3) The General A ~ m b l y  furthcr  dm a0 che 
pd regulation d tdudon of armamcats is tfae pv i&m dp&d 
a d  effective safepards by way of kqxaiofl d & umm to proterr 
complying Smes a g a k  h e  haurds of v i o h h  pnd A. Aaeobd- 
ingly, the G e n d  h s d y  mmmm& to tk -ty Cotmeif that 
, i r ~ ~ ~ p t d ~ t o & e w o r k i n g o u t o f ~ z o p r o v i d t  
I d @al and effectbe &guards m oormcaim with die aoaaol of 
I atomic eaergy and other limibtinn or rephtioa ofammmw. 
! (4) The G a d  hsembly d s  upon the Gwtmmeots of d St~tes to
reader every psible  dstauce to the M r y  6rmd Pod tbe Aamie 
Eaergy Commi~ian in order ro promote the atabli~hmmt of ! 
pee a d  collective sacarity, with the least d i v e r k  fm ~aamarts of 
the world's humau and ecomrmic wmrces. 
Mr. a h ,  Geatlaxm: 
A considerable n u m k  of delegat= have expres~ed thdr vim hm 
on h e  question of &e r d u e r i ~ ~  of armamms. The Soviet deteeption 
I wtcs with s a t i s h i m  that du majority of the +ers took a pogidoe 
arcitode tow& rhir pro&. Therefore, it m y  be considered thot the 
prevailing opjnion nmong the United Natims ~II that it is newspry ro 
rn atm4lt the radnctiaa of armaments. 
If any refkrrnce is to be made to individual @a, I must dwell, 
in h e  Grrt place, on ehe sutemcnts of the British delegate, Sir M e y  I Shawm~a. His attirude is dmndcarry. Sir Hartley Ba*. 
moss may be nndersmod to mean, on the one h d ,  that he, like Mher 
1 s p k e n  dm, is in faMr of h p t h g  a resolution fix the general re& 
of an~~mcnrs, but m the other haad his speeches reflect great dissatis- 
faetian that dis &on hm hm snbmitted to rht G d  Assanbly bor 
d ~ c i o o s r b ~ ~ o l l t & h e s p e a k s a a d w ~ r a s ~ a t ~ c p s -  
sihilirg of dscepdom, pitfalls md propaganda, to which he has d d  
so m d  of his CIQquenet. Let  os hope, however, that he will dm c l d y  
r a k e ,  whep h e  qut8tion in decided, wha is in favor and who is against 
the pcra l  d u c &  of armaments, who is m fawr and who is against 
the @bition of atomic w a p .  
When yon hear speechmi ofthat kind, varims questions arise. Perhaps 
the Swiet Government was wrong to nisc the question of a p e n l  
reduction d amamats? But mMy hac has said so o p l y .  Perhaps, 
however, this quation has been p l a d  t e h c  the Geaerd Asembly 
inopmmely? Here again, d y  has said 90 de6niaeIy. 
!bethe l  it is hinted that we &add &st inm collective Bccority 
and d y  Bfier tfiat has bem dwt h l d  we sa about d i smmnat .  It L 
quite asy to perceive ~ I C  fiIsma of this qumat. It ia oompPtbearible 
to mayone that h e  general rtd& of armmacs under ttre diractioa 
of the United Nations wiU streagdm in- securiry. 
Thaefore, it k precisely h s e  who rue anxious for i n t a n a t i d  
pem and security who should strive to bring a b m  tbe pd reduction 
of mpmeats. OtbeMriue, re* to the necessity of smugthahg 
g m d  m i t y  w d d  only m e  as a m u m  for the who, in d t y ,  
do not admit the necessity of a general redudon of armamenrs. 
What didthe Soviet ~ e o t h a v e i a m i n d ~  it subitttd the 
question of the g e n d  redPCdon of armzments to h e  G c a d  A m b l y  
for rumsideradon? 
Our p p c  was a simple me. It wos that the Gend h m b l y  
shdd tPke the first mzp in mlviog this imprtmt problun. Wk a- 
idmd d dl1 consider ir quite m&icnt that the Gmaal A~smbly 
h 1 d  expres~ its mind rm the fallowing duee qu&. 
Fhr, the Geaetal AssunbIy d d  do a gear deed by dccIariag ia a 
6rm voice &at the time has come w s e t  b u t  the g d  radnction of 
mameots. 
Se~md, the General Asmnb1y is facad with the task of cxpmshg h 
mind on tbe quadon of the prohibition of aoomic energy, k it i~ known 
&at h e  mcnaee o f  aomic w e p p  h musing grut d m  among the 
n a b .  
'Ihird, the Geuerd Assembly &odd recognize the necessity of d 
lishmg ieIiabIe i o r e m h a l  mml cmer the execution of the decish fw 
a general: duction of armaments and the prohibition of Ptomic w c a p ,  
w h a t  this internstianal eonml shanld have at ita dipsal  mesas of 
hipmica for vuifying the situation m all counpies. 
- p e d  redrrcrion of ~rm&. ~ f e e r  &I a d k m  the !hxity 
~ s h o n l d t a b : ~ U p & t d C ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ .  
.' X s  is the suhu~ce  of the Sovict Gmnmat'r ppd. 
, I f w e a r c a l l ~ a p o a d l e n ~ o f t t r i ~ & ~ ~ y  
' w i l t b t a b l e m a d o p o s o F h a ~ l u ~ ~ t h e ~ o f ~ ~  
which wiU hnve h i m r i d  BignXauce. 
SketheSovieeplan was snbmittsd, w e h v c ~ d m r m m k o f  
other plans an the question of the redrPcdon af amammm. It is 
to men* abopt 4 the prop& ofthe AnsaalIPn d ddqx- 
k. F i d y I  i n t h e b t h & ~ t h e * o f & U a h o f A m e d e ~  
h P I ~ m b m i t d t o w , m t h e ~ b j ~ c e o f w ~ ~ ~ y ~  
his f x p h h  on munbet 2, 
'Lb a grata or less cxtmt h e  initiative of the Met U n h  is fUlding 
EqpftindW*. 
I t s b e m s m w ~ t i t ~ t t L j a m ~ ~ A m t r i ~ p f P n m o i w ~  
audm. 
I w i l l n o t h i d c t h t f a c t r h a t & c ~ ~ ; ~ ~ p h u i n i t s ~ f i b r m  
~ ~ a t i s f y m . ~ & i t m b e ~ d ~ 1 d y d ~ d r P r h e t ~  
aided. K5 arc goiq to submit ameadmmtr to thin plan, which e x p ~  
om d ~ i r c s .  
Whilepllruuiug~aimofaebi~rmnnimitymtberceolatiooof~ 
G m d  a b l y  hr the g a d  redmion of amamam, we am 
prepadnotto idston cheplanmbmitted bywandqmwonrtRilling- 
n ~ t o e a k t t h e A m a i m p l a n a s a ~ s f O T ~ ~ . W k t r o p e  
tbat this step by the Soviet ddrgndm will enable us to matimi~ 
SQ that the G a d  AssunbIy, sitting in New kk, may mkc the 6mt 
step in this i m p t a m  -. 
Fmther, I wish to say a h w o d  a h  dK a m e m  w M  & 
hie d c l q a t h  w d d  like to make in &e Amctiwn phi. TheFc are 
m all rhrec amendmarts. 
I will kgin with the amendment relating ro paragrapl~ oac. 011 the one 
hand, &is paragraph speaks of the Security Council, which Bhontd wurk 
om psi$ measures for be rcduaion of armamma. On the ather had, 
~IIC same paragraph sptalta of international ades d yk 
the radncdon of amammm. The gnedm a r k s ,  i what m y  will h e  
deckionon therdnchofarmmmtshtakea: wiilit berpltenby 
umcbhg  hemat id conva~doaP or by a resolation of ahe Smuity 
W? 
Lfwt rake thev iwdm thc r ~ o n o f ~ t n  is o h d e d  
mt by means of  in^^ agrema!~, this will give riw to a good 
m y  F a  for dl mrts of delays. For this rmwu t8e Soviet delegah  . h of the opinion that the d & h  on rhe reductim of wnamenes W d  
k ~ k m  b y ~ o f a d t i o n o f t h e S e c r P i t g C o r m d . 1 ~ i s ~ i m -  
F r  that h e  Gewd h m b l y  s b l d  adopt d h  point of view; 
~ t i ~ ~ ~ o f r h t r e d n e t i a a o f ~ d h e b e l y e x -  
~ . n ! e w o r d i a g o f c f t c ~ s t ~ p h r r m s t ~ P m e n d e d ~ l y .  
With r e g ~ d  toparagraph t af the American plan, he Wee delcptioa 
d d  suggest dmt it be adoprcd in the following fmm: 
"As an caseadd step m w d  the ngrat objacdve of e h h h g  brom 
a& arnammts d c  weapone and a11 Mher major w a p s  adaptable 
to mass d m m a h ,  the G d  hsembly urges the cxpditiow W- 
m m b y & e A w n k E a e g y ~ ~ o f h t e r m s o f ~ a s ~  
rorthin&don 5 o f c h e G m d ~ h l y m l n r i m o f  24Febnwy, 
r@. Aacordingly, in opder k c  that die g a d  w o n  d 
reddon of a m m m t s  are M mward the miof w c p p  of modern 
I warfare Pad not mst l y  foward the m b r  w m p  &t G e n d  A~~semliy 
~ d m t t h e ~ t y ~ d @ t e d ~ o f h x e p o r e  
whid~&AromicEnccgyCoarmis~iwiUmakcmtheSecurityCwmcil 
before 31 kcmhr, 1944 Pad M l i b l t ~ ~ ~ o f  eirewoxkofrhat 
u n n m i ~ d ~ t h a t t h e S e m r i t y C a m e i l ~ t e & d u a h o f a  
&aft oonmdon for the pdibitiaa of a& w e a p . "  
Now permit me to d c  wmc chritiatbns an the snbjecr of t h i ~  
pro*. 
A mdyoftbetextmbmid willBbowthat&efmttmtenoeofthir 
drafr, replacing rhc c o m p d q  smteace of tfie a d  paqmph of 
t h c ~ c o n ~ i s & b p d i l y h & s e e o g d ~ p h o f r h e  
AtlstFnIiPa &aft. The valse of thiu tmmct d s t s  in the fia &at it 
d h d n d o n a d o p w d b y t h e M ~ y w  a4Jmmyof 
&a year r q d q  the e d d i h w ~ t  of a mtnmiggian a, d d  with the 
p b l m  raised by the berg of awmic eatrgy, aud a h  that, in 
a c c m h a  with the ~ t u t i m  reftrred 04 dmt commisdm nmt aoasider 
aa on orgent aim the idhhatioa h m  national mmmntsi of d c  
wwpons and of d other IM~DI w a p  adaptPble to moss desauction. 
W e  d d e r  that mch P ppd Ought not to m a  with o b j h  here. 
In the d smtenoe of fhiB paragraph of the Anmican drafr, in 
additioa to a dight am-t in the text, the hllowhg words ate added 
at the d "And &O dm &e Semity k c i l  exptdice dderadrm 
of P draft comteatim hr the Ppohibitirm of d c  -." This- 
addition clilnktc6 hat one* in dsc text of the 
~ ~ p h o f d l c ~ c a ~ d r o f t , r e c P I l i a g d l e ~ y m e x ~ m i n c  
a h  a draft mvmh f ir  @biting WC w q m s .  
I h a v e r o ~ b t t h e S w i t r d c i e g n k w c u I d r m i r i a a i t ~  
rn men& more prc&dy ahe p&bitian of a d c  we~polrs, aa w s  
h e  in the scoond paragraph of the Sovia &aft. H o w ,  the Met 
d t l c g a t h i s ~ n o c t o i n s i s t t r p o n i m ~ ~ i f & e m x  
o f t t m c ~ ~ o f t h c A m d w n ~ ~ a m e p t o d , w k h d m s c  
m a d n r n m  which I have just mtiond. 
T h e t e x t o f d l c t h i r d ~ p h o f r b e ~ ~ w c ~  
t o b t ~ b l e . W e c o a s i d e r , h o w c v a , b b ~ k ~ a r k  
~ a d o f ~ ~ p h w h o t i s m o a d i n t h e ~ ~ o f k S w i c t  
p r o p o s P l ~ m y m a r e a w a r e , t h t a t P d m o f t w r r ~ c r m m i s  
hns i smmthal :  ~ E o r o h e c o n a a l o f ~ d b d & i m  
q d h g  the radPetiw ofarmamam, d the the -1 
of the ex& of the daeigim re& the pwhibipiw of thc w e  of 
~ c m e ~ g y h m i l i r p r V ~ . A s ~ w i t h h ~ a r  
j n d g e l r o m & m u r s e o f d i ~ k , s n c h a p a o p o a a l d d d l r r t ~  
with any oh+ here. 
The foatrh paragraph of the Ameriuu draft h d ao 
~ e n t s p r e ~ . ~ i s n o n ~ t o d a f d l s t p r r s e m ~  
rhe other amadmmw of 1- im-. 
I will prooeed to the qu& of veto, or, rmre 
to the qu& of the npplicpdon of the priacipk oftaraaimitpofPbe 
, great pwm. In &c prcsmt m e ,  it is m u m r y  w dk@ dw & h a  
m i d -  which has prism in & m m c  ofdimmima. 
A s y o n a l r # d y I m o w , t h e ~ c r ~ m k w & m d t h O t a  
d ~ a n g e n e r a l r e d u & o f ~ t s d a r ~ ' ~ o f  
~ c w E a p ~ w b e ~ ~ & S # x l r i t y ~ . ' Z h e e d o p e i a o  
of m& a decision offers a0 smd di5cnltite. It ia poeleible dmt v m h a  
p o i P e s o f v i e w w i l I b e ~ s e d i n e h e ~ t y ~ ~ ~ S m . ~  
qumh d with this problun. Only tbe a of-ty 
io &e Seauity GoundI d, above all, of i m m k k y  h w v m  ttre 6vc 
~ a w m u n ~ a u g u a r a u t a t h t ~ o f ~ d & h - t o r e d u ~ t  
m m m .  
"Rigkt of VhP M a  
1 .  
&c FQIF m a n h e  mrmatad ia Lhe atraiDmcne of that ma- 
w. &wequmtly, in the formulatian of a dixiaiom 4 the W t y  I 
Unmd to raiucc nrmnmmw, the "right of veto" cm k aercised by say 
, mt of the g t e ~ t  pow-, as long as unanimity ir nor d e d  betwca dl 
&e gmt  powera, d as loag ae the Smrity GrmciI doa not rnke 2s 
d&b in acmdmce with the d e s  of the Qmmx. 
Obmvanee of the prindfle of rmznimity of ht five p a t  pwera ir 
" 
dm -pru for h e  decisions by h e  Sectrrity -dl r d m h g  to the 
! , sabliaunmt of a commission fos mmml of ummmn redueticin, a d  , : 
of the prohibition of amnic wc~pons. But whea decisions qadbg  the 
. ampc%ition of tbe c o n d  d s s i m s  are aka aud the aim1 eom- 
rnimhs begrn their tad ,  they will, of owuse, work it! aardaace with 
: dme rulw drawn np for thm by tbt W r y  Cwmdl. 
It d d d  be quite obvious &t the @on of the welEbwn Ppirmeiplc : d m t a n i m i t y o p c r a r i n g m & e ~ t y G n m d t r w a o r e l n l i o n a r d ~  
the work of the d s & s  themselves. Goseqneady, it ia entirely 
wrong to o~nsider the matter in the iight that pny Govemmmt p x a a i o g  
k':, d ~ c  "right of vew" will bt in a p o a i h  to hinder the l i dhea t  of ~ I C  
m l  ad inpdons. 
The am1 Cwnmissiona are not the M t y  Cotm4 an4 t h h ,  
b- there art rso p d s  whatsoever fiw saying that any power mzkiag use 
f - o f h e  " ~ t  o f m "  wiu be in a position #, ob~trp~t IR -= d 
mnaoi. Every ammpt rn obsmct rhe control or iPsptctioa &ed om 
in acumhce with rhc deeisirmE taken by die Security Caancil will be 
I d i n g  other than a violation of the decisions ofthe Security Cormd. 
Tbar is why talk a h  a "veto" in mamaim with ooncrol and in- 
spaetioD is d m i d  of hdation.  Such talk minot be naderswod as my- 
ding other dm sn attanpt lo mbdmtc one quation for mother, as pa 
attunpt rn evade a straight answer to the qnemim m i d  regprdiag the 
pentral && of armamaim. 
Y 
Thus, we must Lake an important deei&x~. The General M y  
must cake the first step in dcaliug with problems of general d m i m  of 
armmean. Wt must prepare tbat decision md not allow any funha pro- 
cmstiaatica in this matter. 
rI.hc Soviet delegation h o p  that &c hetican draft and du Soviet 
deltgation'a amendma& hereto will anakc for a good frmdnmetrtal 
decision by the General AsmnMy. 
(I) The a& eide of regdadon and disamam~lt must mntinne to 
k banded by the Amrmic Encigy Gmuiss ian .  Thc A d y  must do 
Dorhiag m imerfene with or discourage thtit work. 
- [ 
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. - - (a )  No partial of &&mumit mast be @ to, in b mwc 
~ i b p w e m ~ r t ~ . ~ i n m s p a r i t i o m ~ ~ o r ~ r b ~ m m i i c m e  
~ e f : ~ c b e r a b h p d i b i d , b u t t h e ~ 9 ~ w t ~ ~  
~ i n s r a a c e , r o d c ~ t ~ , i s ~ * I t ~ b P p p e a ~ m m i g h t b c ~ b t e m  
' ~ e ~ ~ c m t h e ~ b o m b , h r h t , t . h P t r i n g a ~  
a k p i e d r r n t m d t y m * ~ ~ a ~ l w  
~ , p e r h a p s e p t a m o r e ~ . ~ e b e A ~ ~  
~ ~ m a s t m n p l c t e i c s ~ w o r ) t a t d p a t ~ a ~ ~  
f w l a a o l m d ~ ~ . ~ ~ h a e b e n r ~ p . ~ k ~  
- amc mro opuarioa conampxat~dy with o similar ph-tb  
t i o n o f w h i d l ~ n o t i a v o ~ a u * l i k t t h e ~ w  " 
br dw abolitian or -1 of ~ IC  other m a m h m a h  weppoaa. I 
. u a y t h a r a p I a f o s t h e g ~ w a n l d m t ~ ~ ~ d i f f i m k i a a , ~ ~ t b  
~ m e r g p . ~ d y w a u t m ~ b i t p m d ~ & e ~ h  
. while we mwt prohibit the tlse of appmic amergp Bpy: p p u  
w c m m t m n k c i t a v a a p o l e n r i d i I i d e s h r ~ ~ a ~ ~ t h * ~  
I 
(3) - h y  o f d h m a m a t m & d e ~  anha&&& 
' ~ a e e i ~ ~ o f # ~ l f a o l d ~ ~ ~ Q f ~ b n M I  
d i ~ o f i D f o r m a d o a a h o a r a r m t s m m t s t o b e ~ w i d t  
the Cs@Wshmrm of tHt orgnkdotl hr d d -b. 1 (4)~h~opnrh.of the00~0Idirupccl imrss leg~lod;0h 
m ~ o f i n s ~ k t o ~ y i o ~ ~ w e a p o a s ~ a w b e ~ m ~ ~ '  
vm.  W& rqard  &at as very v id .  Thm must be ~ a m c  h m d d  
q m h i a a  which coa d a l  with a d y  hmated wcqmb. h -'+ 
. r m m t m ~ i s ~ ~ m i t i m a i l l , I c i a r e m y , ~ ~ l r a r n  
L the discomy of samctbiag cvar more terrible. There muzit be an ~IW 
n ~ e l b o d y , a o t ~ m v e o o , ~ o b ~ a n a t o a c e d e P I d ~ a p d  
limatian. 
I p m ~ t h P r M r . M d ~ ' s ~ ~ l t p v e r r s ~ m h o p a ~ ~  
h e  and frnak disrsssian, in a m b i e  spirit of givt aud tpkk we may 
rcpcb a w n p h  ~ 1 n d o n  embodyiag & k n t  e t a  of all drPfts, 
Pnd~daacrPllybyonlysome 
r o % & e ~ ~ . T b e ~ ~ b y t h c ~ t p Q r m r e i l ~ ~  
~ b y t h e ~ - G m d r o t h e ~ b a r s o f t h e U n i o e d N ~  
f a F ~ ~ u ~ ~ ~ o f t t s t ~ ~ ~ y * T h e &  
m ~ ~ ~ p p r r w e d b y t h c G u w d ~ b l ~ ! W b e ~ t t e a  
so the dgmmq Smtm~ M a b m  i%r rat%& in with 
' ~ ~ 1 6 0 f r h a C b a r t c r .  
; ( a ~ A s a n ~ & l s r e p ~ t h e u r p t o b j e c d v e o f d ~ ~ f i . a m  
~ ~ d c a n d d o r f i e r m ~ w a p ~ ~  
m p a s ~ P n d h ~ k y e s e p b l i s h m e n t ~ f i a # l m o t i o a a l d ~ f  
a ~ e n e r g y a d o t f s e t m o d r m ~ c ~ ~ ~ d a c h n i c o r &  
v t l n p m r a s p m i n s p r e r f i e i t ~ d y h p d a p m c p o s t s , t h a ~  
Adyu lp th ta - -by . th tA&*Com-  
mkhofitarrermsafrefarapeasactforthinSeaioa~dthe~ 
Which~AmnlieEaergg 
Pad that it & d M e  tht 
r t s c o f & m e r g p ~ ~ t ~ p a d r h c ~ h  
~ a t l l e p l r i m p r y ~ b i l i r y h t h t ~ o f '  I 
p a d s ~ t y , a n i n ~ W a y a t m , ~  " darhtodof 
~ ~ , ~ ~ s p e e i p l o g p a s , * ~ a h a I I ~ ~ t  
their p a 8  and mm &om h e  -vmdaa or o o a v a i k  & which 
tu aootlcratc m much mnch p i b l e  the'plaeing at b &pal ofkc Prmed 
forca mentioned in Arcicle 43 of h e  Cbnmr. It r#wntrmmds thc h a  
to ttndmakc rhe m v e  d b a l d  w i d h d  d d q  
of rhe n e d  of M, oftheir h c a  amtiand in e*mlany&mh, 
P a d t f i E w i t h d r d w i ~ t d e I a y ~ f f o ~ ~ i n t h e t e r d ~  
ofmemhwidumtdxirootlsmt~yandplblicly#indw 
or agrcamm arasisrent with he Qlorar and i ~ #  mmsdbiq hw- 
mioanI agrcanmts. It further mmmda a m r m p d q  of 
~ P r m a d B o r ~ , n n d ~ g a ! e n I ~ v e a u d ~ ~  
of thesc natioaPl armed Ibrces. 
(5) The Gmmd Assunbly calls u p  dl h h k 8  d drc Uiiatd 
Nadons m rmder every psdble astimmc w tfie-rp an8 
~heAtomicEaergyGrrrmispiOnin&to~thcesrnblishmmtof 
~ p t o e e a u d m l l e e d v e s e c u r i t y w i r h c t m e l c a s t ~ ~  
armmen& of& wwld's human d d c  remuma. 
(6) Noding hcrdn mn&ed &all alter or limit &e r d a h  of tb 
GareralAssunbly pnssedon January x q ,  rMmdqtfieAa#nie- 
Gmmi~oa. 
Vb Terms of Rdkeace of the C o r r t m i ~  
-* -. . ,; :' e F m m a - t i a a h m - ~ f d ~ v l  1 
2 .  "piad nfd othec major w w p s  mhpble m mam dmzmdon; 
D.'For&~m&p&bymydinspeeeicmatldder~m . - ptcct cumplying has Pgainst h e  kmla of v i o ~ ~  aad cvasia~. 
The work of the nmi.aion shed* pmtd by ~cp ra te  rrrgu, d ~ c  
mmmsfnl mpletb of a& of whi& will h d o p  the necemy con- '+'' ' *&h, of the world &fore Qe nm mge is uudermkm. 
nK mm$sim &dl mt h b g c  up00 the rapdbilities of my 
q a n  ofthe United Natim, but d d d  preae~t reammdatims for the 
S: 1 uf&weorgpas it1 tfrepbmaweoftheirmb m d ~ ~  the 
.-I -8 0f ~ S C  %red -8 ChPrttr. 
ADDRESS BY BYRNES 
The. United Stafes supporn w h o I c h ~ y  &c propel rdurioo 
whieh ha as itsi objective a p e r d  reductim of ~rmameats with & d v c  
d @ s  to insure complying States agihst the k d s  of violatims 
sod evasions. 
Ever since tht close of hostiliria it has h the @icy of the United 
hm to h e n  the return of condidom of pa. UE yam m mabk the 
6ghriOg men of thc United Natims to rctnm to their homes aud thdr 
hdics,  W want to give the peoples of all lnads the chance m rtbuiId 
what ohe war has desmyed. 
The tasks of rec0amdm requte 9 thc human, material and spiritual 
mmrca thpc a n  be made available. 
There need be no mum about the williagoess of the Amerim people 
m do c m y h h g  w i t h  their pm to rid themdvedi d he world of 
the burden of excessive armnmmo, 
In the r m a r  past the m c e m  of pce-.lovmg nations has m ka that 
Ameria mainmid excessive armaments. The a m c m  has bem thnr 
America failed tu maintain adqua= ammenu m guntd & pace. , 
When Elidex ~ b m d  the world war in !kpmber, 1939, Gqmy 
had btcn preparing for war for more d m  five years. But at rhat time there 
were in aedvt s d e t  of h e  United States in the Amy, Navy md Air 
Force d y  3j0,ooo meo. It was nar milimy w&ess, nab om miliwry 
me+, that encmragcd h i 8  aggrasion. 
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AfPer WmIdWar I, J a p  WM g h  a mandm ova  matqi4ly 
~ i s l ~ i n ~ 8 ~ n t h w c s t P & ~ ~ b a D n d h c r t u k c c p d m s e  
~ ~ ~ . A l ~ t 4 l e ~ ~ t b p t J o p a a ~  
~ t h e t c n n s o f t h c ~ t h c U ~ s L n a s d e l P ~ l a ~  
hsa OII islda lmder her EwveFdgary m tfie Pacific. 
T b e d c w n s r t b e t w h m 4 e U a i a d S m f e ~ ~ ~ d y n t m c k d  
atPPeaHarhrahehdnoadcqaaDelyfoxtifiedbaaeinhhd6cbehReen 
Pcprl H n r b  d the Wliphca. 
J a p ' a  -ant nclt  to me tht i n d a d  t d t a k  aa milimy haw 
camhcd ao &par& m bmc ~~. Japan's #r9paaat a 
& U n i t e d S a t e s , b a t I t d i d a o t ~ J f p a r r . ~ w p a a m : ~ t l  
A a d w c d o n o t i a a a d p g p i n ~ m a k t ~ ~ m i m k t .  
~ h i l e g e ~ ~ t t d ~ ~ ~ t h ~ p m - ~ ~ w m & n g  
p m c e t k q h d i ~ ~ ~ ~ w e r e ~ n p t h d r  
armmnars.Audall the w b i i e a g p m r n u & m w e r e ~ u p ~ - ~  
~ ~ w u t ~ d m t t h q w c t t ~ ~ d ~  
by other na-. 
. While we s m p d  bactlcship, Japan scrnppbd bhaqrriDts. W W  
w e r e d n a a d o u r ~ ~ w , ~ ~ o f a l a r g ~ ~ ~ G c ~ &  
its y t h  6x war. ' Tmiate,dme~badtnlrrosfmdhgpmi.tkemuggieraDgBb&gaoal 
disarmament beime %Id W§r LI dime& d m  Aris qaa wuc 
dt l ibmdy otgPniziPg and srtpporriag &raunmmt nmunmm in 
thnnmcnt dimmed tbat it wm not safe to rely upoa any dj- 
which L not mUectiPeIy eafaroad d d e  a part of s of 
d r y .  
I t w i l l ~ t i m e , p n t i ~ m d g o o d w i l l t o  & e p r d y  d&t -. The d a i d t i e ~  rue great d tile owapl&es mpny. Tke 
~ d s o f S c a t F s r  vary +y.Theelemer~s whicfimoketrpd~e 
m i l i E p r y ~ o f S t a t t s ~ v a r y g r ~ d y a n d ~ l u m o t d p b c  
oompruadorappkaisad. 
E&tk d i m e m  carmot be sEcnred by any hplc  rndcmpticP1 
r r h e . D e m o ~ M ~ 1 8 r p n L ~ y m a d t o t h e ~ . ~ a  
smpped pInne or a mapped battleship utu never k t e m m k d d .  
Dimmameat to be EffocdPe amst laok to the fumetme Ifa w y  f h  a 
aosmdi~byl imi t iDgthc~ofd lebswPadanegw.  
1 
*~ah.tBllyitarmldhnsbrsl,rIta~gmpada~~db i 
it dmt dissprmma~t mm wioh the major w q m  of 
i r & a t ~ i p g e n Q P l d m t ~ .  
~ n m s t ~ m i t t h a t d i s a r m a m e a t r ~ m ~ g m t r a l ~  
' ~ s r e k c p t b y l ~ l m e S h o r # ~ a a d i g m r t e d b y ~ ~ t e s .  
' I46 mna set #I it dm &-eat is m a d  by d d v e  6 
' , & b y w s y o f ~ a n d & m ~ & b r ~ d a m t m l  
will proact complying Statcs qim the h d  of viol ah^ 
: sndcvosians. 
M m ~ t o i t t h a t k ~ d s o r e m d m d ~ l i d t t h a t  
~ g p i l l b e n o ~ & a b ~ r i g h t o f o o m p l ~ ~ ~ , ~ o r n o v e # r ,  
b o E P 1 I e ~ ~ ~ m d e f P a ~ o f t h c m I e o f l P w .  
I ~ ~ ~ e s I r w d i d i l l g ~ w e z k d  
qgmshcpa ever d h t e  ar world pa 4 
Thett src other wepposs of mass ~~ but dess  we em me# 
& c ~ e n g e o f ~ ~ c m d r e a d f u I m p c p e r d # i s c d  
- w c c m n e v e r m # r r h e ~ o f t h e s e o d m ~ p c m s .  
The United Stam, wirh Britain ad Gmada, have their 
n~~ of the grave mpsibiIity iohecent in their discovery of the 
me~ns of applying amtic energy. 
In a workl of t m d d  amammu, a d c  clmergy w d d  bt au 
~ a g e ~ r h e U u i t e d S r a t t s h m e n y y e ~ r s t u o a a .  
k i t i s a o t r f i e d ~ r e o f t h e U n i ~ ~ t a b t ~ 1 e a d e r h p l ~ -  
meatracc.Wprektoprwm~&thorrtnwin,thenerrt~~r. 
That's why President ' L i r t m a o d a s ~ a s h e k n m r t I m t t h  
atomic bamb w d d  work. rbat it wau orrr w e  to c o I I o b  with 
o $ ~ e r t m k s  m ium that a d  energy shoutdnot beoome a dmat to 
of the tbrcle Gwcmmmw mpdbte 
f a r & d i B o o v e r y o f a o o m i c ~ m c t a t ~ P a d u r g e d t h p t t h t  
U ~ N a ~ s e t u p a ~ w t # w r t m n r a d p r o p o s n l r s f o r t h t  
deuive in- e o a d  of aomic mergy and Ofan d u b  
nmm of mass dczmah.  
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- Q m o f r h e p r i m o r y r u m s f o r m y d p m ~ i n ~ b e r ,  
~ ~ , w a s m p B k t h e ~ U ~ m j d n w i & ~ s u d ~ i o  
~ ~ ~ ~ ) t h i B & ~ ~ t h t ~ ~ ~ .  
~ a o o n ~ t h t ~ ~ f t b e ~ ~ ~ ~ t s i r r a I ,  
F r m c e P n d C h i a o w c r e ~ ~ ~ d ~ P g r e r d m ~ i n ~  
lh mlntioa. Thw &om d t d  in tk.- p y  O f k  
m d n t h b y t h e G d A s s e m b i y i u  Jmnary, i ~ o n E j ~ ~  
dm rhc discrmery d tht atomic bomb, 
r m b f i t h e u n i a d ~ & ~ p o b l i c * a ~ w &  
o f t h t ~ n i t a d s ~ p ~ ~ h a v c ~  blmrddww- 
d magnimde of ~ I C  United Smm ididpt. 
T b e d ~ ~ m i d l e ~ a a o u r ~ ~ ~ ~ o f  
M Q m i e a l c r g y a n d ~ o f d l 6 ~ h k , ~ ~ ~ ~ m B o M  
itadtodimmbworld.Mkdidn'tskbackd &-% 
a m e ~ W i t h a u ~ p r o p ~ ~  hl4z,rqrY 
p r d d y r o ~ o a t t b t t a & ~ d m t E e a t d ~ .  
~ ~ w ~ f r r l I y ~ d l w v e ~ d w ~ ~  
apoasibIe fm the ditmvay of a& enex@ no * *-d aw
be &aced 4th fr Maker8 dttre Unired N* 
( 3 a r ~ ~ r h e ~ o f a t o m i c ~ d ~ 2 6 e  
dkpd of gisting atomic wapnn. 
I T h e y ' m n p p n i n ~ ~ ~ r 6 ~ b ~ t b E  
I ~ ~ a n d n s t o f ~ c w ~ ~ w a x ~ ~ b ~  
) develop d c  eaegy for hmaa wclfpte. 
O u r ~ h p r o P i d e & ~ a n d ~ a l ~ ~  
viohtkw and micas.  They mablc 
. .  * ~ d o m ~ p n y d t r m r m a o n  
8 i ~ d t h e t m t y ~ t h i a s u b j a % . W d o s g t t t H r t ~ b  
r r c ~ t y h n s b e # r m e & e c t i v e b t h e r c c r n b e m ~ m e ~ ~  
, s r w t a n o f f ~ h ~ c  
W e a r c ~ m ~ ~ ~ s r f ~ ~ w i r h ~  
I reneof&edontfi*dtb,d&(mthecaaditiaa,tht6ik ~ w r b m i r , a s w e a r e ~ t o d m n i ~ b ~ y ~  ~ d ~ s r d a .  Frrrmthestpmmmmdtiod,tammi~olsdinrfsc~, w e h a v e ~ ~ m b d i e v e t h a t o t h e ~ s ~ w ~ a ~  mbmit m in temaw inspe#iPa. 
kz .vtl&eeh*bombsnrrr&atyte,-a ~ b * m B y h t h e m m s g ~ b e w ~ .  
~ ; ' % r d w w o r d s h d d ~ t h P t ~ t ~ v e ~  
.~mknOcafleai~&armommt* 
r i . ' f b a ~ t i 0 1 1 w c ~ e d h f f e ~ & ~ f u l f i l t a e a t b y  
~ ~ ~ E a ~ ~ S i Q n o f i t s ~ J ~ e t . ~ ~  
~ t h r d m t d y d ~ m q y b n t d t e m ~ . 8 f o r h e c  .. 
admmsdmrda 
' W W h + e m t d h e n d h ~ m p a i e t l ~ r h s t # # ~ f  
~ B ~ ~ t o f o m & t c p l a m b r ~ w i t h m a j w p l a n s  
p f d b r k m m t .  
~ m ~ ~ e v p a n ~ ~ w ~ a t r d n o t d i ~ . a t l r  
~ c m t h e 1 ~ i m ~ t ~ e m s o F p w t m I h g p i ~ d b n d  
.@* 
3 f w e ~ r d I y i n ~ e d i n ~ d ~ ~ n n d n a t ~  
$ d k h g ~ ~ i t , w e ~ d ~ ~ w t r ~ d P e s . ~ n Q a A ~ e  
~ C O m m i d m m p m s ~ w i e h i t s ~ ~ ~ .  
Tttt~mmi~hasbemwwork&&~~hcgcm~miaterim 
r e p o r t ~ a r a d r . X d o m o t w a n t & c w u f k o f ~ d ~ ~ I r e s i e a  
wdkd m zhtagcd. 
I m g d t h a t & e ~ ~ r P r i s ~ i n a ~ r m & w & ~  
p b 1 m  of & a r t h e ~ o f ~ ~ f d w ~ r r a d e h c  
j a m  ofdveir prersrrrecca f&ga soil. Fw dismmmm rimy 
~ d r e q u ~ d t h G m c w h i c h m a y b e m a d r o f ~ a d W ~  
W h i e A o r ~ . n o t ~ % ~ ~ c ; P g ~ w i l t ~ b r i n g ~ i f  
h ' m a a n d t h c  ~ ~ d l P t ~ ~ ~ ~ s e d m r m d e r m i n e d a e t m e  
wty. 
lheUnit#l&amzhar per4aeteneEypss;edfar thewfy-cd 
~ ~ w & I t a l y a n d ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ . ~ ~ . o o &  
pdde  rhc comp3ete wi-wd of tropps b. rtms !bra?. 
, TkeU&cdStatEshs~&lpeendymgad&eclm&simdr~tmty 
~ ~ ~ c e ~ o f m d ~ ~ ~ ~ w a l  
PfMp lroop. 
A u s m i a , m o r r x ~ t w , i e a ~ d n & m ~ ~ ~ - ' I B e  
' U M ~ , U d i t * d ~ d ~ e ~ U d ~ a ; o ~ 8 d t k ~  
eowDec tamhdrq+~ ,  n r t ~ a ~ h e r o f t b ~ d  
@captim*cbe~gosW~ 
T t m c U n i r e d f b m ~ z h P t ~ ~ ~ b C ~ p  
' ~ w d ~ ~ r a y '  - of**. 
F o r t h a t ~ w c p T B p o E d a 0 t h t ~ o f P ~ ~ ~ ~ r  
I01 
4 
w e d w d d ~ a p d c d h g u c l a t f i e ~ ~ i n ~ . M  
dmt~~~ea~fccment th i swedc ,hweahat l . .mt imrcam&om 
t O r e d a c t r h e ~ t i o n f O K # l h ~ W n r c ~ p r c p a m d ~ 6 r .  
~ a t i l i P g s t o r & e . ~ t i o a h i n J a p d ~ .  
& h d S m s % F i p m G h m  
~ V - J D n y w ~ h P d o ~ f i v ~ ~ r r o o p ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~  
3ut d e c e  the mmmdous prublrm of l i q d d q  mc aaarai.ee 
Q v e r m  war kpitia, d a y  we b e  l a  than $SO,,orro tmp * 
. o f A m e r i ~ ~ n ~ . M o ~ o f t f i - ~ ~ r e i a ~ y ~ J a p ~ n , a n d  
rhc Japarm Llaade, ICarw, Aamia d veaaia ads. 
T f t c g r w t m a p r i t y o f & e ~ w e h v e a e h t ~ d & ~  
S e M a o n t d e i h ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p ~ t r O n ~ ~ a s ~ s u p p I y w ~ -  
4. L c t m e m t e ~ c d l l y  just w h a t ~ r m o p e w t b a p t i n d r e e e  
~ h P o e a m O l o f ~ 6 , ~ m i I i t P f y ~ d i n t h e ~ b a t  
oaly Pbaut~o,oooarec~mbatforces, sirsndgmnud,andofdm?c~~,& 
nrc Wppine Scouts. Th- m q s  are in the 
bPck up om Eom in Japan. Substmud 
inthenmfahuc. 
Of the r 9 , m  troops we have m an, a h r  15,ooo am d 
mops d m q H y  me M o f  dwe are ro be nndtr orders ao rcmm hoarme, 
We have abolre 1,s- trmp in Panama, mchdhg the Gd h 
Onethomaudofthcse, ownpod of a d air Mir and - h a i r  
warnhg a b t ~ ,  can be d a d e d  as m b n t  b. I%%h d 
coarst, our n o d  pwtective forces in the Panama 6aP1 Zoat proper. 
~ b n v e w o o m ~ t r m i ~ i n ~ i ~ d ~ d u t h n a ~ I b a o e j a a t  
I mend&. 
O n r m i l i e v y ~ ~ d i n I e e l ~ 1 1 ~ m k I ~ t h p n 6 0 0 ~ . ~ ~  
inJnde no combat troops. They are being withdrawn rapidly and all dl = 
be withdrawn by carly April, 1547, io accordnce wiph one a g m m a  
with the Gwermaent of Idad. The military p c r d  have bEcn therc . 
d y t o ~ m e o f f m r ~ ~ ~ ~ l i a e s o f ~ w i t b  I w - p i m ~ i n ~ y .  In the on rhe muthan air 
ddiw ammg than. They are mluiuar~ d admini 
Tbcg arc there and= sgreaamt with the Govmmmt 
* rn -1 
I X h e i r t p 8 I r i s m a s i s t i n ~ a a e t f i e ~ o f  
~ ~ w b b ~ t ~ ~ ~ d ~ t i o n o f r f s F J s p a t l # r e .  
TI& mission is d y  mmplered. hstxn& hawe barn h e d  for the 
k ~ t h a t m t i l d t i m ~ m r c  
WE hye made it clear that our trmp% wiU not bccwrse &* 
i a e m i l s t t i f e i a ~ a . 3 u t w e ~ r e e ~ g e r t o & o a r ~ d w t h o p c  
~ ~ a r e c a g t r ~ d o t h e i r p a r c , m p r e p e a r e i v i l ~ ~ ~ m C E d a n ~  
topromoteaMi t i edaud~dca i ina .  
A fr# d iadqrcadent China i s ' d d  to worId pce.  M amat 
+re or wlmte &om u p  rfie part of my h e  m rcenrd tht ddop 
m m o f d 3 c ~ d ~ o f ~ a .  
The United Smta -t repdam the suggeseion that om 
~ i u C b i t l a o r ~ q w i t h & c ~ t o f ~ ~ # r a c a n a d ,  
p t e o t f r r c P t t o ~ i n ~ o r a e P P a l p e ~ e t o f a ~ y # w n ~ .  
h e  the rqrmmmdve of the &viu Union has referrsd to c#lr 
~ i n ~ i t b ~ h r n e r n ~ y ~ t I m ~ h t h c a o m k  
ofAmaimmropsiaMwrh~orehbsthppthemnaberofSwiet 
umpe in- M d a  in the M Arthnt am. 
Ur&theFinnaphpe~ceeewytkSovictU&~thcrightm 
1 ~ t f i e P D T ~ a n a P P I ~ i n F i n I p n d a a d m n i a m i n ~ t h m . ~  
t e m p o m r ~ p c n c e o f a f f f P ~ U n i a e d ~ t e ~ ~ i n C h i n n , a t  
c c d d y  rpisesno esnmtidy diff~eot @OQ 
h & e p e a r r n n e n e p r ~ o f S o v i c t m p @ i n m h e r a m & y r m d a  
trear)f arrangemars. 
I t i s a r u d e s i r t m l i v e ~ o ~ t h c l ~ n n d d t e S p i r i t o f r h t ~ w  
~ti00*Wc~~onotintaaduscom~mglthtmiss0f* 
!hm ocwanry to the pqma and +pits of the United N a h .  
l i h e i m p I ~ t i a n o f e h e ~ ~ i ! 3 m m P d e & c r b y  
loose chprges or aimmr-Fharp. lht W d o n  raqaites d t a r i o n .  
t and of d& b t y ,  
L a  Dewmh at Momw we d m i  the %via Unim d tbe 
U n i a e d & g d o m ~ a m ~ i n ~ . W c h a v e m w ~ e d h r  
~ i n t t r e 6 9 a c i l o f F 0 4 e i g n I l l i n i ~ ~ r ~ t l s e t m m b e r o f  
m m p s m b e r e c a i a t d i n G e r m P n y , P o l ~ h d a , ~ d R u m a u i a  
u p  dte0011dnshoftficp~ncctrdawith theex-saditcSa#es. 
Asb IbqW ftw smdgq 
~ n a t i ~ a ~ n o t d y ~ ~ ~ d h t ~  
they believe others havenot the d s t m g t h m & b  
S o ~ t y ~ b e ~ y d n o r ~ ~ ~ ~ b y s ~ d  
nmva and by organid @itid 
W d p c a c e d e p u t d s n p w h a r i s m o n r ~ m o r e P b P n ~ w h n t  
h wrim in om =tics. 
Grwtstntesmustsaivefor 
e c e  and hqri ty of the m d e r  h. 
I t i a r n o t m t h e i n t p r e 8 t o f p e p c e d ~ ~ & ~ p w ~ f e e  
& t i o a s h i p ~ g r e a t S E p t e s s h o u M d e p c t l d a p a a ~ ~ ~  
mmestopowcrinIran,orinGreeceorinQh. 
Greats ta t~rn~notpumif  d i E : e f s t c d s ~ m o a g ~ p p , ~  
d e t  rfie politid uniw of m d h  Smea, 
rcmgnim that m e  collectme seairiry ra$a 
much all &at of &e larger Seatcs. W1* the c q u a t b  ofl+&ca 
ond 4 h, o9r dirarmammt viaus we d w m d  w &lm, 
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I desire to make jnst a fewokmrimu on dabprokof d i m  
meat d searriry. Like the -miye from. the United Stam, 
were iamhred in the @u&m of che atomic w w  aud
& t h c m r ~ ~ ~ o v e r m y G o P m l m e n t t m k ~ , t f u a n g h ~  
A t e l e e , t o k t h e i m e h ~ d o f & ~ ~ ~  
d t e d i n t h e e o n f e r e a c e ~ w a s h c M w i d l ~ ~ ~ ~  
in wadhgtm h yar. 
O o r p t w ~ b b e e a t u a y m o b m r o l t h c ~ t o f t h i a  
&ovmy, w d e r f a l  if nsed for p c &  p p a  but Bodr a deadly 
~ i f ~ h ~ P a d o o p y a a d ~ s - s r o y , ~ L w ~ i n t h e  
dePelopnaeat of dace between n h ,  which wilI mnkc cdnaol 
d we eEent ,  
~ h r t 6 c ~ o p o f t h e  
s s i o n . W q a r d m ~ b a r b a r m d b y t b &  
; c i b  now and arc pledged m w p m  the A d c  &mission d it 
has -p?eted its mk. 
~ t ~ s k i C h a s r o ~ , l  ~ i s o n c o f d r e ~ ~ f H P f :  
h n a b e m p i v e n w m y # n m n i s ~ m ~ . I t w i l l a e e d ~ ~  
~ e , ~ o n d , i f I m a y ~ t , i t ~ b e s d C d i f i c i s d e P l t w i e b o n a  
bwisofpolidmtdet. I t a u d y  a c h i e v e ~ i f d I d u @ e n  
t O k d s 8 i 0 1 1 w r t r t i t ~ a o a d m w l l ~ t o t ~ y r o ~  
~ S d n t i t i s ~ i m ~ ~  
~ ~ d i s m e r y Q f ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ 0 f b d D g a s c d ~  
I arprpPOPidingdpwmunbebroughrto&Pheirr#~. 
~&tFtfore,~~pointilffamwmakci~thathaaycoas~tian 
. drhia problem, we earmot tre divated or ammt agree KO lx d i d  h m  
t h e w o r k a n d t h e r ~ b i I i d e s o f t h e ~ ~ s i t m w h i d r . ~  
d d y d r m c m d .  
Tnmhg to tfregenewlqudon of&-I said in t h e m -  
dmimdIrepththrwehavehag@racmmayhna 
!' ' k m g t f f a r t z , s n d I ~ t h c w h o l e ~ w i l l a g m t h p t w t r P t e v e r  
may be s a i d o b o a t d  hoPtbmg$arc said abttl-foughr 
~ , d m w e r c m i t h ~ ~ m & e e n d P n d c m p ~ n e r t e r  
 pad-^. 
O ~ y ~ t h e r e ~ b t w , # ~ r m a y i n ~ w m l d ~ b g o t a  
g r w a r d ~ a r ~ ~ a r l d ~ t P D d ~ ~ t h a a g . 8  
a a e d m ~ ~ d s , i s a n e d y , t h P e i m , ~ c o ~ ~ B c d o n b y a  
world gmmmmt orgPnizPtim whioh a n  semrc dte puce 4 which 
. l R i l l a c t d e a i d y a r P U ~ ~ ~ T n t P O d a E ? e S r o a a e m ~ & e  
&ofa%pmt. 
~ o w m t r y , X s a y , h r h e w ~ M h n s a ~ i n t ~ 0 1 : 0 ~ &  
r n ~ ~ ~ $ 8 1 ~ I i a h d .  
~ ~ ~ t d p S r d o n ~ I ~ ~ i f I ~ a y t h t W C a p p d I ~  
yhh d m ;  dm ffte a q h g  of r e d u h ,  o o m p m k  wdutions, 
a r i ~ t ~ ~ ~ & ~ o f l o q g ~ d o a a a d ~ i a t P r r t m n y d t a d  
m 1919. d l e ~ e i n m a ~ ~ o f s ~ . T h a t i a w h h + '  
aafion had goat, and mutthen, my aamqypcadd&~e by- 
& c l i m i n t i m ~ o f d ~ n n a m e n t s , d ~ y b y ~ ~ ~  
~ t & c n e e a t G e n e v p t o g r t o g a ~ s ~ n e ~ a o o h r r  
problem of war and its dangers. 
B u t w h i l e ~ v e r y n e t u ~ . a s ~ ~ l a m e r a n i a d t h e U d d  
Nations, with d dlat.hPd km pnt down, Qnc * * dc+edty, 
~~8vioktiqitlongbcforedtfaooghfficyhodbamPdmirad~t~thF 
Leag~ebefore theywi thdrcw.And in thc~r f i ey~ tb t t l r taQat  
internadoaal oqanhim.  
' i h & r e , t h e r t s e e m s t o u s m b e t w o t h i P g s ~ & ~  
mprosccutedimmamm bPtmorgPnize t h c p a E l f i e ~ ~ ~  
nations, the likty-Iovhg nations, BO that those who lorn -:Pad 
d a n o w c y a r c r ~ y t o ~ i t ~ t h a r m d i n g ~ ~ d d r c i r  
~ 0 f ~  
I t i s h p h n r ~ d r a t m y c w n a y i s s m d y i a g f b i a ~ l l o d I s a y o o  
every nation -in this great mn- wearem&, &I 
any rtwmeat to q i y  yau with any informtiop yotl dwttG in d m  PP 
give effect to the Chartet of the United N a b .  We are Z& 
~ n y s d m u , a a d , ~ , w l a i n g t b t ~ & ' o f a u c h ~ n s ~  
habe to bcar to get a coma b e  thar we beliep.e will arork. 
Andmay l a y ,  w e n r e w i d d n r 9 i f ~ ~ p r # 8 p  
this AssembIy agenda h any orher purpoac &an the arryht&mt of 
akd@aotls& the m. 
l f i t b d o a e - - o a d I m r m b e 9 . ; t t M ~ ~ & a m t i c Q 9 l e ~ &  
pntitonrhe~ortow$fbrpwpagaada,howaperdwletaopbbl'  
abnsed,wecaanotdcetheinrerestofaxpaDplt~dmor*rorsdff. 
h w a w i l l p d o G p l y P l a d s o r m d l y a d ~ y w i e h n n y & ~  
t l la twiucameintothisgrcat~ .  
L A  - ~ s h ~ ~  
C ' NOW, sir, Mr. Byma, on Wdf of &c United %mi, hw made 6 
e n c c s r o t f r e ~ o f t h n t g r e a t ~ o a d e m o b i l i z s t i o n s a d ~ ~  
i a t h e h . 1  amnxinposaessicuhertat&ir mdumuofdm&d 
~ b u t w e h n v c ~ e d ~ ~ f ~ t o ~ ~ ~ P a r h ~ ~ B o w  
~ o n r ~ ~ w e l l ~ 6 , ~ ~ ; ~ m ~ t o & e ~  
b quoted, w am now w d  M o w  a million. And w m  it m~ lh tfw 
~ t m ~ m 8 a f ~ r h a t w e h a v e i a G a m o a y d ~ d  
Vtn& Goilia, they wouId go dawn still htk. 
I r b ~ t b o r r r ~ ~ l i k e m W b a s h n d a o s p a s d i n ~  
w a m ~ f i v e ~ ~ o f i w d t e d ~ a n d ~  
~ d d ~ i w ~ ~ ~ e x ~ i n t h e ~ I d , i t k s o  
d 
O l m h t b a t w e ~ t ~ ~ d d H o o t ~ w n ~ a o ~  




~ r e q u i t e d b y o h e ~ i a o r d m & a t ~ k n m v ~  whichwe
r d i i y g i v c , w i i l b e d b y ~ C o r m c i l d b y t h e ~ a o d c f i a d  
h p p e ~ ~ .  
Now, I h P V t r u d t h i s ~ w i & p e r y g r e p t m r e a n d I h v t . d m  
d ~ ~ O f r h e F i f s t ~ m ~ e ~ & & ~ ~ ~  
~ ' ' m ~ ~ ~ ~ p i & t f % e ~ ~ c f i ~  
~ m c m b e r s ~ b e ~ a p ~ n t o ~ i i n w d c r t o g i v e d e c r  
a o d w t t r ~ ~ ~ " a n d d w . ~ ~ m t h e m ~ o n d  
h c a  of the United N&m. 
I accept thatradmh. Onbehalfofmy ~ w m e w , I ~ . ~  
' . geaeral rcaohdon whidt I regard aa ol Ixsb h r  r d  wmk m k cam- 
d . A n d l a n s t e b a c i t f l a t i l l m d m m d y a d o p a o d , b r  
t b p t i F f R i n b e E p H c n ~ a ~ t o t h e ~ o f t b ~ t e d  
~ ~ e i a a ~ m + s ~ ~ ~ d i e b e s t ~ r d i c y a n g a r m  
AM-#-- 
r office since Jdy, r 9 g 5 .  Dar' i  dut time we haw b#n aoing nodkg &e 
~ s a m i n g u , c c e ~ t c P h e s i m a u o a t o ~ M i a h f i # d o m ~ ~ ~ ~  
are~ofrhewofldaswecpl ,dl  rhink thcmiarehehodEPZaDh- - 
d i a t c  om attitude of mind. 
%ate miving to d e  h e  greaeproblemofhb, d 1 p y  aad 
hope dm all parries wdl be abIe to mihe to &eve the right madm 
brdmtgreptsnb&at, which willmake i r m w w m r y ~ ~ h P P i n g  
to k c q  mops &ere at 4. 
W e  Lad a ten-yes trcoty, a mlemn meaty bmem a d  mtmebm 
ItWcdIthe Alfiw a r e i n d e b t e d t o ~ f o r c h e g r t a t s d i t d  
during tfie wax in dipsing in territory and o p k b  which 
p r e v d t h e e ~ e m y ~ j o ~ h a p 6 d t r o n g h t I I ~ ~ ~ n a d  
prohably d h g  the war much lmgep and lnnch mrc d i m ;  bat 
when w e w e r e a @ e d r ~ & i t w e r d i t y ~ d n ~  
~ * o n h P h e s ~ n ~ d r ~ . A a d i n ~ ~ f i e l d s , t o o . h e w d ~ r  
we an see peace ~ n d  ga &mait pad d m g ~  my h 
adamring m mrry oat a long-tenn prcrgressivo policy h tbcsa hsIds. 
Iapolopemmbody foraurmaduct.MhweWaruaffitodeaa 
&edheatof~8UnitedNPtiotls, bat I h b m ,  ssImid,b& 
in the cnmmirttc ad elsewhere, ~lutim, cptlhs, and d~ m pm 
u u d m i a ~ w b a s E d i t & c r e o a c e ~ P a d o o r # r r m r r p ~  
n d y  Wipd out. 
M w e r e w i t h i n a t i a a o f b d n g ~ t e d T h e r e f o r e , t b t i m e t ~ e  
w p n t m s c c c h a t w e W ~ s P f c , ~ a o t m a r d y o n a ~ o f ~  
but oa a basis of dectioe responsibility ia WE& evtrp natia~, 
and mall, mkes its s h e  ar oblicdt~te war forever, 
I h a v e ~ y h a d o c d m t o s e r f o r t b f r o m t b h ~ d w ~  
of rhc SoPict Govemma~t on the m b j j  of a g d  mh&m af ama- 
' 
maits, which we arc dimsing now. The reams wbi& pi&d h 
Swia GovcmmentinetJs~nestionppereaet~ipmy -*Pfr 
I made on October 19 h n  diu r o a m .  
W i r h d & ~ m o r e ~ d o n d i a ~ w e h d t H e ~ d b  
v i m o f ~ ~ m ~ b w h i n t b e o W n m i t t # d i n t h 6 ~  
AssunbIy. IndePd, the pmmtday in rawiod  simptian Ma-in 
r c s p e e t s f n # n t h a t w h i & e f f i d ~ t h e h W b r I d ~ .  
W a l I a r t m i n d f n l o f t b i s ~ e r r n a . ~ d ~ ~ -  
a h  %Id War 11, is not h e  Gcrmomy dwt d d  &er MrM War I. 
hd we add to this fact that thc Jam of the patwar period, Wrld 
'Ur, 11, is aot the same japan, but ir also a defiated conaay. 
And if we ore mindhl of hese facts, and also dthe fict that Gumnay 
Pnd J a p  wcm the a w m t r i e e  of which set its b e  in the &st aad 
the other in the West-that they were the connaics that plunged countries 
botb mall wd gteat into ~ IC  vortex of &e war, this facr is of m u m d o u s  
irnpottaace. 
It pea without mying thnt if, in our policy wward the aggmsmt Smta 
defated in this war, we are determined to p m e  thnr policy ro ita cwl- 
dnaion and to demilitarize and dislrm the ~ggressive cwmmts, d see 
to it thnt hey never become aggresrwrs agrinif we p m e  thzt s-Ie 
fir the dcmoaabtion to the end, and if we ay to rid &we countries of 
G m ,  the necessity of which we nxqnid during the war, a d  the 
necessity of whi& we mognh now, it will mean that, as fir rn ~ I C  
h e r  aggresors arc conmed, we shall  -re favorable eondrioas dm 
will help us to resolwe d~e'radr~ before us in accordance with &c interests 
of pea- snd the necessity hr  pr-mrioP of a new aggression. 
The ikr is t s d d  that tbm are no cormtriea now which d dmf I 
from the objectives of the interdona1 organization which was created ' 
to main& p c e  aud s&ty. There& lies the difference in the situation ' 
asc~wnparcdmtbatafm~ldwarl .  
Now, all the cmmoiesl whicfi m y  be d e d  damnt ic  d m  arc 
a b f c m t P k e p i n & e m ~ w t h ? t a r c ~ c o s 5 ~ p e p e e d  
security, and all h s e  counmiw are now members of tfie United  nation^ 
olganhtim. 
This is an irnpmnt wudition for die mlntion of the p b l e m  of 
& w e n t ;  and now it depends u p  our h e  to cooperate with each 
other, u p  oar urr-ess to set off one p m y  .rgninse the other, d 
upon oar determination not to prmit the c r a b  of bIom against otber 
co~mcries, and nor to strive to submit other m a i m  to o m ' s  dmnindq 
influeace. If  we work PlCQlg the of chc principles underlying the 
United Nations organization, we are sure to safeguard the pa d 
k t y  of a l l  p p l e ~ .  
Now, I shall return to the resoIution which we have bcfcuc as far 
mideration. The Soviet delegation, whea it suggested that pqwml 
to the Gmcral Assembly for muiderrtian, was guided by two basic 
ideas. I% musidered it necessary rhac the United NPdrmsl o r g m h h  
& C  
'-HE & * that die United Nab c a p u k t b  & d d  w 
~ . h m C ~ ~ " m o f ~ ~ d ~ O f O ~ ~ ~ ~ o r ~ r n r y  
T b t d r d i ~ o u r m w w ~ ~ t o ~ ~ d ~ y e m b o d i ~ d  
' F ( K O O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ V C I ~ +  ~BhP~~loe.cancd,fio~,ttmtbCSoPidddqah 
w a P l d l i k e o o ~ t h ~ ~ i d e P s ~ b y i t , e m ~ h c h o ~  
h laadeard-&teh .Hof f t ever ,*ore*k  
the ~~, a d  the Swiu ddqption, h E 3 t ' c ,  is d e d   wid^ & 
wmkoftbt d t t e e p n d t h c ~ i t b  asic  hmhhdmm 
T b A d W w p p ~ a  
~ r ~ o d p Y , ~ ~ ~ Y , m r b - r i d ~ . r r r i m ~ ~ ~ Y -  ' 
Pnditswhmilir~ry~.Itisqniredwhthis~dwcgpoa 
i a w o r c h y o f p a r e i d ~ a ~ . ~ t h c S o v i c r d r r a f f ~  
s ~ b m i r t e d l a i d ~ m t f i e ~ b i t i o n o f a m m i c w w p ~ ~ ~  
objdm. 
I r i s e l e P r t h a t ~ o t o m i c w a p L m t a ~ ~ ~  
whm pbopk d ns abmt the interam of the ddbm d W  
mmcry, it gaea without saying dw whmt is far the w d  
o a e ' s ~ ~ o n d f o r t h e ~ o f o a e ' s o o a n t r y i ~ a o t & e ~ ~  
c p n k a # m n ~ e d b y t f i e m o f P t o m i c ~ . ~ e a & ~  ' 
f l m a t ~ f b r a s e i n w t ' s o w n ~ h d e s t i n e d f & . ~ f n  
d e r ' s  &tory. 
l h e ~ L d o n ~ i s n o w 8 ~ b m i t r e d m t h e ~ e m e r a l ~ ,  
d t f i e ~ a n w h i r h t h e ~ A s ~ b I y w i l l ~ ~ ~  
t h e h  step ~ g e n e r p l ~  
re@d, which 
t. Mcr this, &other 8aps 
will have so bc taken by $It Secdty Caoncii. This4ba 
very mprmut mk that will: k c  the security Conneil, a d  it r h  
br IU t;o wish rtre M t y  Cormcild possiblu wccm in ia 
mart* 
TO*, the %A delcgstim wilbu m arpga ia & s h i m  d~ & 
fir~~resnl~bavealtadybeeudkdm~tdiraedoa,a~~dl~rtbP 
the eoopgPtiotl which we achieved in mbmiaing r c ~ ~ l u i h ~ l d b t  
G m d  Aambly. WE alwr hwrd today tbat dimmmmt cmtw b 
~ ~ ~ e , P n d ~ o n e i s v e r b r 3 1 y  i n f a r m r o f a a  
o f ~ t s , h m ~ h e m y s ~ h a o t + t e a h ~  
Ofmorse, h a s t e i n B U C h a n ~ t m a t t e r  a e d i a  is i n a m ,  
a n d n a ~ d o d v i 8 e o n y o n e m b e h n s t y i t l t h i a i m ~ ~ a ~  
~ s i s a & ~ p b l e m , a h p a s s s w f i i & w ~ ~ ~ , ~  
-- - 
i ro 
~ . ~ m s t i t a o C b $ i e v e t f i p t t h e m r t w e h ? v e ~ m ~  
' - ~ ~ , & e m o r e w e b ~ m ~ ~ P i f ~ b e J r O n d t h e ~ t ~ o f  
arse'r counttiess. 
~ c e s ~ m a d t ~ ~ o t f r e i r t f o m r a t i ~ ~ ~ ~ r m o p s p t ~ -  
tiollddmhreqndtorics,bwitgotsarirhoatsayingchetmuhitlronnn- 




~ e S w i e t ~ ~ t i o a  is Pnxioas thotdcdsiunm&t+mtofthe 
~ d a o o p s o m ~ ~ w s h o a l d n o t b e d e l a ~ . L e t n s ~ e  
thb decision a t ~ I  d m  we shpll know whew lxwps of the Memks of the 
United Nations are stadoaed, where t h y  have got their basts. The eInd- ' 
d e d o n o f ~ q a h d d y b e ~ ~ . A t c h e m m a e n t w h ~ l  wewe 
a h t  to adopt a decision regPrding the rednuion of a m m a s  d rhe 
~ ~ d & e a s e o f a t O m i c ~ h m i t i t a r y ~ , t h i s i n -  
f m ~ t i a n  wilI be pdarlarly udd .  
Ih dopion of P dedsiai m dte redu&n d armamas wiII inhencc 
themili~~wbi&itisanopenseaatomq~mfid 
b t 3 f o a d d p ~ w b y c e r t P i n h , Z t i s c l w r t h p t t h e ~ s d  
a a r e o r m t r i e s w i l l M a n r ~ o n & e ~ o f ~ r m ~ d  
on the &on of military btPdgets beawe Eherse deuaions will resalt I 
inrcdudngthe~eaofraxatiaathatresaroc! t h e ~ ~ ~ d  
~ p r i c e s d o ~ , ~ t h i s ~ d ~ ~ ~ ~ d d y n c e d s o f d K ~ .  
T h & e , m e o f b o b j ~ t b P r d b e r c h i d b y h ~  
of mmmmts will be the r e d u h  of miIitarg Mgm d thia fhce will 
b e b a i l e d w i t h r r m g h o f ~ e f i n d l ~ .  
h d O & ~ d e c i ~ 0 a ~ d U r a d a c r i o n 0 f 9 ~ ~  
c a a n o t o v c r ~  c h e f a c t ~ n o w ,  in c e m b w a ~ ,  now dwherccarr 
war is ended, thmeis d g o i n g o n  ha id  p p g d a  in fpplafofs 
a c a r m . A t d t ~ ~ * u , f h t ~ ~ ~ t o f L h i s p P O p a g a n d P ~ b e  
aondncivewrbeaaopt imofrhe~now~w,  
W h e a w e a r e m M a b D t l e & t ~ o f t f u p m s , d m a n e ~ y  
~ w h y t h i s f i e e d o m o f t k p t # r s ~ b e n s e d i n a r d c r m o a r m t c r -  
F l  
f b  m & s ~ m f w o r o f ~ , d y ~ ~ o f t h e p r c s e c a a  d y b u ~ f o r ~ i n f w l o r o f a n m w ~ d w h y w e ~ ~ a r i e ~  k .  ~ ~ ~ w a r s h o n l d n o t ~ t h e ~ t o d e r ~ l r r t e ~  i 
w thcpmpagmdain kwt O ~ I D R I R W ~ ~ ' .  D T h e ~ ~ y h a s ~ a m D m b e t o f d d c i s i o n s . S o m e a f  ahem are impomat and &era are Icw i m p a m  and fhis Will bc x q n k d  r: - 
b c c ~ n n r e d o s o n e o f & e r n o s t i m p o r m t ~ ~ b y r h c ~  
hsmlbly. The fher that rhh deciubn Waa W b p d  mmbwiy in the 
ammittet p m prove that it is a t i d y  decisian. 
If we do@ tbia d & h  tmanhdy ,  it war k u m c  we d racog- 
sized theurgeocaamreafthis decision d its t imdka and& fhet 
that it nmca the intcresnr of d e a  and &at it smas the awe d 
p e p e e . ' T h e r e f o r e ~ S w i a d e l e g o t i m e z p r e s ~ i m ~ t b o t t h e  
Imnn;m;~whichopas&spIayedinthehdtiaaofphisMsiQeHrhe 
~ t t c e d b e m a n i f e s t e d b y o e i n t h c ~ d ~ y w b a r e  
come m adopt it. 
INTERNATIONAL NOTES 
~ M B E R  16, T~@--JANWAW 22, 1947 
THE U ~ D  NATIONS 
Y 
.Prtpard by the Editorial Assirrant, Division of Inrcnmme d F h d m  ! 
The AtaPPtic E w g y  C O l f f m E i w  h b e r  30,  tfie Corn- 
migsiw adopted its firm report to the Security Council by a vote 
of 10 to o, the *a U ~ o n  and Poiand absraining. The repm, 
which reammends the establishmem of "a suoag and comprs ' 
hensive international system of control and inspection," the scope 
and functions of which should be "dehd  by a' treaty or con- 
vention in which all of the nations M&8 of the United Nations 
should be entided to participate m fair a d  +table rerms," 
dpalates that this international symm "should become operative 
only when those Membexs of the Uniced Nations necessary to 
assure its- success by signing snd ratifying the treaty or convtndon 
.have b o d  themselves to accept and support it." The treaty or 
cmveatim, the report says, should provide for the esmblishment 
in the United Nations of on International Authority with powem 
b r d  and flexible amugh to permit "the prompc a d  effective 
discharge of be dutia imposed on it" ad to enable ir to "deal 
with new dwelopmam that m y  hm&ec arise in the field of 
atomic energy." The Authority would be charged with tfie task 
of promoting the beaeficial uses of atomic energy and would have 
"the exclusive right to carry on atomic =ch for destructive 
purposes." The Soviet Union a h W  froan voting became of 
its objection to inclusion in the report of a clause stating that 
"Qnce violatians constiming intemadonal crimedl have bten 
defined and the m e a m  of e n f o r m t  and punishment therefor 
agreed to in the treaty or mveation, there s h d  be no Iegal right, 
by veto at otherwise, whereby a willful violator of the terms of 
the ueaty or convention shall lx proteczed from the c o m q m m  
of violation of its m." (For text of m c m m & ~ ~ ~ ,  see 
Nclw Yhk T k s ,  kc. 3 r, (946.) 
Bemacd M. h c h  and the other members of the United States 
ddepdon to the United Natiom A d c  &wgy Commission 
resigned m Jarmary 4. In submitting the resignations to Presidem 




I ' p M e m  of generd clhmmmt is before the M t y  CommciX, the United Sram w d  be better d m'hwe i d d c  d o n o n t h e ~ i y C o r m c i l a a d b b e ~ ~ ~  mission. Fonher Senator Vbmm R. Unitcrd h sentative aa the Security Colmcil, has since beaa a p k d  m rep- 
! resent the United &ares on the Atomic Paergp Gmmhh Plao. 
Tb &wq -A Sovia mpm thst tbc of 
general disarmament be pIaaed on the fqe ttSe &writy 
C m d  meeting of h b e r  31  contahda p p d  t k t t a t  
-1 establih a commission, on which e a c h ~ ~  m d e r  
w d b e r e p r ~ t o w o r k w e ~ d ~ ~ ~  
the General Assanbly's decision of Detember 14 crd 8 . , L 
and rhat the propids agreed upon by tbe cau&&%~ I& strb. 
m i t t e d m h M r y C o t m c i l L ' w i t b i a t b i a a p e r i J d ~ ~ q  
two m m h  but not later than three months!' & N I ,  t Z Z  
Times, Dec. tg ,  for text of note.) At rfse lhmba 3s n d q ,  
the United h e s  qmmtative prop& efiot in ita M m  
oa dimmamat the Coancil accord priodry w t i  q f W h  of 
' atomic w e a p .  (See Nap Yok Tim,  Jan. I, 5m c r f e  
tion.) DebateheldmJammy9d r ~ w a s b m c b h 8 A ~  
States requebt ofJannnry 15 tbat all -bp 
p p e d  to Febnrary 4 was approved by the 6- 
2 0  by a vote of 9 to 2, the Soviet Union a d  P O W  
delay. 
In a a d m c e  with a Cwncil decision o 
mission on which the eleven mmbers of the 
(the U.SS-R., the United -om, 
Chiaa, A d a ,  Beigiuq Brazil, Co 
has been sent to the Bdkm  am^ to rn- 
Nodem Greece along the f h t k r  betwen Greece:&,&@ &k ' 
had and Albania, Bulgaria, md Y&via m dm *'.: :&. 
~ t h e f n c t s r e l a d n g r o t h e d e g d b c l d 9 . ~ $ m g  
the btim.' (Far or of rraolotia. e-dhbhq * cqh!&& . 
m New ?brk H d  Tribwu, Dcr. 20.) . A . . 
l a t h  Aarmlia a m ,  the rhed ag& o k b *  rbn 
w as= mipsibiliry for guaranteeing tk +* 
dqdm of the Frce Territory of 'Iiim aa 
in the pcrmanmt Statute of thc Free %&pwL* 
of Foreign Miaisters at its receat W ~ W J -  
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TEE PUCE TEuMm 
The o f E d  hh of the peace tpeatia for Italy, BnIgaria, 
Finland, Hmgq,  and Rmnania weee distributed at Washington 
on January r7 to the diplomatic m i s h s  of he-  Allied and as- 
d a t e d  Powers of the !kcad WarM War. Secretary of State 
James F. Bymes, whose resignation for reasons of health was 
a m d  cw January 7, signed the treaties witfi Iraly, BuIga&, 
H n p g a r y , d R r u n a n i a ( t h e U n i ~ ~ i m a p a r t p t o t k c  
treav with F W  b w e  that m m q  was never b d l y  at 
warwiththeUnitedStates) on J a n u a r p 2 0 ~ a h I o ~ a c t  
More mming over his o&c to his mxcca- k g c  
C. Marshall. *sador Jdersoa Wq will aa for rhe United 
h e s  d m  the treaties are signed at Paris on February ro by 
repaamtives ofthe Allies and of the five h e r  enemy owntriep. 
(The N m  Ymk Tks published the full t a t s  of rhe treaties on 
J-Fy 18.) 
Deputies of the Foreig M h k m s  of the Sovia Union, Great 
Britain, France, and the Unitad s.tateS began the prepsraoory work 
on peace treaties for Anstria aad Germany at Londm on January 
14. The four Foreign Ministas are to o p  dktmions of the 
pee settlemeat9 with A d a  a d  Gemmy at Moscow on 
March KO. 
In an address before the NationaI Newspap" h d a t i a n  an 
J a .  17, Mr. John Fatreer Ddb, a @upant in the work of 
fhmhg h e  peace meaties, smsed the need of the adopian by 
the Utlited States of a more d d v e  foreign policy-a h i s  
held also by R~~ leaders in CoDgress. Mr. Dull- devoted 
a put of his talk to rhe task caPlfronting the coming A at 
Muscow d outlined a program in respe~e to Gmmny caiIing 
fbr its politid h t r a h t i o n  through applic~tion of the fkkd 
form& and for the developmm of "dre i n d d  poteatid of 
westem Gumany in the interm of h e  economic life of wcsmn 
&ope, including Gemany." (For fnll text, see New York 
H d d  T ~ b ,  January r 8.) 
O n J m ~ ~ , i h t d a t e o n w h i c h ~ ~ r m e m a s S e e r e c s r y  
of State wasr armormoed, General George C. M a r M s  m m t  
unthesitllariatincfrinawasmadepublicat Waahbgcm.Gamd 
Marshail, who went to China a ycsr ago m aa in o mediamy 
apcity in negotiarions b e e p  tke Nachak Gmmmm 
aadtheQlineseCorrrmuaimtobmggboUrpeaceddwemls 
W t  of a stable d m t i c  form of gwemmuz in U h a ,  , 
mentioned as factors involved in the mmnt brddmn of the ,:=
aegodntim: "the almost o v e r w ~ g  nspEiad. 
ttre Chin- Commanim and go~enmmene hadm 
aha; the premce. in rhc National Go- of '3 
a C M r t h  Skw M&, Jan. 7; NPW-&k Z " d  a New 
'Ilork H d d  T f h ,  Jan. 8.) G a d  h f d d ' s  mpm ,* 
m e n d  President Trt3maa's summary of thc past *IS- hbp 
mats in China issued l h e m k  18. (Far m 
H d d  T r i h  or New Ywk Tinw, k. rg; -'o&mm 
B d h a ,  Vol. XV, No. 39 I, h m n b e r  29,  1-1 
A new Coostimtion designed to 
rule in China was adopted by the Na 
at Nankiag fmn NOV& r 5 to lkmk 25.  @u@ W 
marked in his report that it was " 
d s t e  did not see fit to pardupate m 
Coasdtution . . . adopted seems to include 
they wanted." The Gmtitutim, which 
cemkr 25, r 947, following the holding of eldm & _&P the 
elemion of three represmmtive Mes: "dte. 
lawmalung body, h m l  Yuan or upper xwid~-mhkdy 
censorial powers, and a large National As*. s h s d d y  
will be named every six years and will elect the h i h t  a d  
Vice-president and 'exercise politial powers a ~ &a 
people.' " (Fw details, see Nclw Y M ~  Tiws, 26.) 
It w a s  repMeed from Nanking on k e m k  30 +"&e w' 
C h i n a p a r t y a r p d t h e ~ a l D e m ~ c r a t i c p a r e g ( ~ ~ ~  
@ti& groups, other thaa the * . ' d p m  
in h e  National AssembIy) have brm f b d y  +&&m jdh & 
gov-t. 
The National Governem's most o%k t~ 
ncgoeiatiom with the Commuuistir was r e j e d  m January r 8. 
The Cornmuaim are mid to demaad as a d t i m  for rampti011 
of negotiations, ammlment of the new #natitudon and a mum 
to the military posiam of a year ago. 
'-.. f 
For tfie &st time in seven Frame has a completely con- 
dtutional government. In .a joint  on on January r 6 ,  h two 
houses of Parli~ment-the National AssunbIy a d  the Conacil 
of the R e p u b l i 4 d  V b t  Autial, a §midi% as Resident 
8 of the Republic. Solid suppore from the &mmmisrcfs a d  Socialists 
' *- died M. Auriol to win 45 t of the 883 votes mt. InstalIed 
at once, M. Auriol &wd the resignation of M e r  k 
Blum d his allsodalist  C a b  d rommiss id  Pad Ramadier 
'-(also a Socialist) to h a new gownmat. The W e t  selaaed 
by M. Ramadier d presented to President Auriol on January 
z 2 was described in a Paris ditprch as "combining a wide d t i m  
of party group b e d  m a c c n d  nucleus of Sdalim, who will 
raain most of the important: economic pmts." Georges Bidanlt, 
who was Provisional President and Prexnier from June 26 nmil 
his wignation on Nowmk 28 w h  the newly d d  National 
Assembly held im k t  mbeting, holds the post of M i h e r  of 
Foreign Affair8 in the new go~ernment. (For list of Cabinet 
memberar, see Nezu Y5rk Tnws, Jan. 1 3 .) 
Wben Uan Blum red@ the M e r s h i p  on January 16 he 
had just r d  from a tw&y discussian with British o&ds 
in London c o m i n g  "pr&tm% of O W ~ ~ O I ~  interest to the 
Governments of France and the United Kingdom." Prime Minister 
Adee's oflice announced, Jmuary 15, that as a result of the dis- 
cussions the two governmum will open negotiations shortly 
for the conclusion of ''a may of alliance . . . within the h e -  
work of Article s t  of the Charter of the United Nations," & 
jectives of which are the prevention of any further a p s i o n  by 
Germany, the presmtion of peace and semity, and improve 
ment in AngIo-French m a n i c  relations. (For text of mtement, 
see N m  YmR T k s  or New York Hdd T i h ,  Jan. 16.) 
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